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No Vacancy: Why Congress Can Regulate Senate Vacancy-Filling
Elections Without Amending (or Offending) the Constitution
Abstract
There currently exists no uniform method for filling vacancies in the United States Senate, leaving the states to
create and implement their own vacancy-filling procedures. As a result of recent problems under this system,
such as ex-Governor Rod Blagojevich’s notorious scandal in Illinois, some in Congress have suggested a
standardized method for filling Senate vacancies. However, an apparent constitutional conflict between the
Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy-filling clause presents the question of whether
such standardization could be accomplished with federal legislation, or whether it would require amending
the Constitution. Applying the textual, structural, and historical approaches of constitutional interpretation to
this conflict shows that the Seventeenth Amendment did not alter Congress’s Elections Clause authority to
fashion regulations for all types of Senate elections, including those to fill vacancies. Since the Amendment’s
primary goal was to eliminate state legislatures’ selection of senators, it would be an absurd textual result to
interpret the Amendment as giving states any exclusive authority over vacancy-filling elections. Such an
interpretation would also create structural inconsistency among the Constitution’s elections provisions and
contravene the intent of the Seventeenth Amendment’s framers. Thus, if Congress wants to create a uniform
method for filling U.S. Senate vacancies, it can—and should—do so through regular federal legislation, which,
even after the Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification, remains a constitutionally-permissible exercise of
Congress’s Elections Clause authority.
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COMMENTS 
NO VACANCY:  WHY CONGRESS CAN 
REGULATE SENATE VACANCY-FILLING 
ELECTIONS WITHOUT AMENDING (OR 
OFFENDING) THE CONSTITUTION 
ZACHARY M. ISTA* 
There currently exists no uniform method for filling vacancies in the United States 
Senate, leaving the states to create and implement their own vacancy-filling 
procedures.  As a result of recent problems under this system, such as ex-Governor Rod 
Blagojevich’s notorious scandal in Illinois, some in Congress have suggested a 
standardized method for filling Senate vacancies.  However, an apparent 
constitutional conflict between the Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment’s 
vacancy-filling clause presents the question of whether such standardization could be 
accomplished with federal legislation, or whether it would require amending the 
Constitution.   
Applying the textual, structural, and historical approaches of constitutional 
interpretation to this conflict shows that the Seventeenth Amendment did not alter 
Congress’s Elections Clause authority to fashion regulations for all types of Senate 
elections, including those to fill vacancies.  Since the Amendment’s primary goal was 
to eliminate state legislatures’ selection of senators, it would be an absurd textual result 
to interpret the Amendment as giving states any exclusive authority over vacancy-
filling elections.  Such an interpretation would also create structural inconsistency 
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among the Constitution’s elections provisions and contravene the intent of the 
Seventeenth Amendment’s framers.  Thus, if Congress wants to create a uniform 
method for filling U.S. Senate vacancies, it can—and should—do so through regular 
federal legislation, which, even after the Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification, 
remains a constitutionally-permissible exercise of Congress’s Elections Clause authority. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although his governorship ended in embarrassment, scandal, and, 
ultimately, impeachment,1 one cannot deny that Rod Blagojevich 
recognized the inherent value of a United States Senate seat:  “I’ve 
got this thing, and it’s [expletive] golden, and . . . I’m just not giving 
it up for [expletive] nothing.”2  In that now-infamous quote, 
Blagojevich was referring to his power to temporarily appoint 
someone to fill Illinois’s open Senate seat, which Barack Obama had 
vacated upon his election to the presidency.3  However, Blagojevich 
abused this power and engaged in political corruption when he 
attempted to sell this Senate seat to whoever promised him a large 
campaign donation4 or a powerful governmental appointment.5  
                                                          
 1. See Ray Long & Rick Pearson, G-Rod Out:  Blagojevich Ends Political Career with 
Closing Plea, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2009, at A6 (discussing the disgraced Governor’s 
removal from statewide office in Illinois following his indictment on federal 
corruption charges). 
 2. See “I’ve got this thing and it’s f---ing golden”, SALON, (Dec. 9, 2008) (on file with 
Law Review), http://www.salon.com/news/primary_sources/2008/12/09/ 
blagojevich_complaint (describing ex-Governor Blagojevich’s expletive-laced rant 
about how much political power he wielded in being able to fill Barack Obama’s 
vacant Senate seat).  The Federal Bureau of Investigation caught this rant on tape as 
part of their ongoing investigation of the Illinois governor.  Id. 
 3. See Michael Scherer, Governor Gone Wild:  The Blagojevich Scandal, TIME, (Dec. 
11, 2008), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1865954,00.html 
(explaining how Governor Blagojevich treated his power like a tradable commodity). 
 4. See id. (describing how Blagojevich discussed appointing Representative Jesse 
Jackson, Jr. to the Senate seat in exchange for $1.5 million in campaign 
contributions). 
ISTA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2012 8:09 PM 
330 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:327 
When Blagojevich’s improprieties eventually came to light, he faced 
federal corruption charges.6 
While the Blagojevich saga highlighted the general problem of 
political corruption, it also exposed the inherent problems with the 
current system for filling Senate vacancies.  The Seventeenth 
Amendment compels each state to hold an election to fill a vacant 
Senate seat.7  However, the Amendment empowers states to decide 
whether to temporarily fill such vacancies in the interim period 
between when the seat is vacated and when an election can be held to 
fill it permanently.8  Accordingly, procedures vary from state to state, 
with no uniform national standard guiding how Senate vacancies are 
filled.9  
In light of the Blagojevich scandal and of other recent noteworthy 
Senate vacancies,10 federal lawmakers have sought to standardize how 
all Senate vacancies are filled.  In 2009, Representative Aaron Schock 
introduced the Ethical and Legal Elections for Congressional 
Transitions (ELECT) Act.11  Congressman Schock’s proposal would 
require states to hold a special Senate election within ninety days of a 
seat vacancy, while also allowing governors to make a temporary 
                                                          
 5. See Natasha Korecki, Blagojevich on Jarrett:  “How Bad Does She Want to Be U.S. 
Senator?”, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES:  THE BLAGO BLOG (June 23, 2010, 4:08 PM), 
http://blogs.suntimes.com/blago/2010/06/blagojevich_on_jarrett_how_bad.html 
(describing how Blagojevich wanted to be named Secretary of Health and Human 
Services in exchange for appointing Obama-advisor Valerie Jarrett to the Senate). 
 6. See Jeff Coen, Blagojevich, Others Indicted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2009, at A14 
(detailing the federal indictment against Blagojevich, which included charges for 
attempting to sell Illinois’s vacant Senate seat and for attempting to extort campaign 
donations from sitting Congressmen). At his first trial, however, a deadlocked federal 
jury only convicted Blagojevich on one of the twenty-four charged counts—making 
false statements to the F.B.I.  See Monica Davey & Susan Saulny, For Blagojevich, A 
Guilty Verdict on 1 of 24 Counts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A1 (discussing how 
federal prosecutors failed to make their case to the jury in Blagojevich’s trial).  At a 
second trial, a new jury convicted Blagojevich of seventeen additional federal 
charges.  Chris Bury, Rod Blagojevich Convicted on Corruption Charges, ABC NEWS (June 
27, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/rod-blagojevich-convicted-corruption-
charges/story?id=13940088#.TsnMnbKlmU8. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.  When Senate vacancies occur, the Seventeenth 
Amendment dictates that “the executive authority of each state shall issue writs of 
election to fill such vacancies.”  Id.   
 8. See id. (“[T]he legislature of any state may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the 
legislature may direct.”). 
 9. See generally SULA P. RICHARDSON & THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
97-1009 GOV, HOUSE AND SENATE VACANCIES:  HOW ARE THEY FILLED? 9 (2003) 
(providing examples of various states’ methods for temporarily filling Senate 
vacancies). 
 10. See infra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing the string of Senate 
vacancies following the 2008 presidential election). 
 11. H.R. 899, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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Senate appointment until the election was completed.12  That same 
year, Senators Russell Feingold, John McCain, and Mark Begich 
proposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution removing states’ 
authority to make temporary appointments altogether by mandating 
that all Senators be elected directly by the voters in each state.13 
While both proposals sought to address the perceived problems of 
states’ ad hoc approach to filling Senate vacancies, one did so 
through the regular legislative process, and the other proposed 
amending the U.S. Constitution.14  This significant discrepancy in 
means begs the question of why some legislators felt that a 
constitutional amendment was necessary to address the issue of 
Senate vacancies, whereas others felt a federal statute would suffice.   
The answer to that question lies in an apparent constitutional 
conflict between the Elections Clause and the vacancy-filling 
provision of the Seventeenth Amendment.  The Elections Clause 
grants Congress the power to “make or alter . . . regulations” as to the 
“[t]imes, [p]laces, and [m]anner of holding [e]lections for Senators 
and Representatives,”15 while the Seventeenth Amendment authorizes 
states “to make temporary [Senate] appointments until the people fill 
the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.”16  The conflict, 
therefore, is whether the “as the legislature may direct” language in 
the Seventeenth Amendment grants states exclusive power to 
regulate special Senate elections, or whether their regulatory power 
over those elections is subject to Congress’s Elections Clause 
authority. 
This Comment will argue that Congress can exercise its Elections 
Clause authority over special vacancy-filling Senate elections because 
a textual, structural, and historical analysis shows that the 
Seventeenth Amendment did not create a realm of exclusive power 
for state legislatures in these types of elections.  This Comment also 
will analyze how both existing case law and traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation apply to the text of the Seventeenth 
Amendment.  Lastly, this Comment will argue that not only is 
legislation regulating special Senate elections constitutionally 
permissible, it is also preferable because of prevailing policy 
concerns.  
                                                          
 12. Id. 
 13. S.J. Res. 7, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 14. Compare H.R. 899, 111th Cong. (2009) (addressing Senate vacancies through 
traditional legislation), with S.J. 7, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing a constitutional 
amendment to mandate how states fill Senate vacancies). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (emphasis added). 
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Part I of this Comment will provide background regarding the 
ratification of the Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment, 
including its legislative history.  Part I will also highlight the 
reemergence of the direct election of Senators as a modern political 
issue by discussing efforts both to repeal the Amendment and to 
standardize how states fill Senate vacancies.  Lastly, Part I will provide 
a brief overview of the applicable methods of constitutional and 
statutory interpretation used to analyze the apparent conflict between 
the Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment. 
Part II will use this background information to analyze the 
constitutionality of proposed legislation, which would mandate 
uniform procedures for filling Senate vacancies in every state.  First, 
Part II will consider whether that type of legislation falls under 
Congress’s traditional Elections Clause authority.  Next, Part II will 
use textual, structural, and historical analyses to discuss whether the 
vacancy-filling provision of the Seventeenth Amendment changes 
Congress’s Elections Clause authority over special Senate elections.  
Finally, Part II will discuss why a statutory remedy is preferable to a 
constitutional amendment in resolving the problems associated with 
Senate vacancies.   
Lastly, this Comment will summarize the information and 
arguments explored in Parts I and II to conclude that a statutory 
solution to the issue of Senate vacancies is both permissible and 
preferable.  
I. BACKGROUND 
This section traces three major themes:  (1) Congress’s 
constitutional power over federal elections; (2) the Seventeenth 
Amendment’s ratification journey, including the renewed interest in 
the Amendment on the national political stage; and (3) the 
traditional tools of constitutional and statutory interpretation.  
A. Article I, Section 4:  The Elections Clause 
Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution—commonly called the 
Elections Clause—provides that “the [t]imes, [p]laces, and [m]anner 
of holding [e]lections for Senators and Representatives shall be 
prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress 
may at any time, by law, make or alter such Regulations, except as to 
the places of chusing [sic] Senators.”17  This provision was included in 
the Constitution as a check on the states’ potential to abuse their 
                                                          
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
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power to hold federal elections.18  Framers like Alexander Hamilton 
worried that leaving the regulation of federal elections to the whims 
of individual state legislatures was fraught with peril.19  Accordingly, 
the Elections Clause represents a “broad grant of federal power . . . 
combined with [an] unusually narrow grant of state power.”20   
Yet, even though the Elections Clause envisioned “a particularly 
strong congressional role” in regulating federal elections,21 Congress 
did not first exercise this constitutional power until 1842, when it 
passed a law mandating that members of Congress be elected by 
voting districts.22  Over two decades later, Congress made a similar 
entreaty into federal elections by regulating when state legislatures 
had to meet to fill U.S. Senate vacancies.23  Despite its early hesitation 
to act, Congress has since enacted numerous elections regulations,24 
including establishing a national election day,25 mandating when 
states must hold election for U.S. Senators,26 and, most recently, 
establishing procedures for how states must fill vacant seats in the 
House of Representatives.27  
B. Interpreting the Elections Clause  
Because of a steady stream of litigation in federal court, it is now 
well settled that the Elections Clause is a default constitutional 
provision, meaning that states may regulate elections only insofar as 
Congress has declined to preempt these state preferences.28  This 
section will explore this established general principle and how courts 
have applied it to various challenges before them. 
                                                          
 18. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 808–09 (1995) (listing 
examples of the types of abuse that were “the Framers’ overriding concern” in 
including the Elections Clause in the Constitution); see also Millsaps v. Thompson, 
259 F.3d 535, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2001) (chronicling the Framers’ fear that states would 
undermine the existence of the federal government by unfaithfully promulgating 
elections regulations designed to limit the federal government’s ability to act). 
 19. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 301 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 
2009) (cautioning that leaving the power to regulate federal elections solely to the 
states would “leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy”). 
 20. Election Law—Statutory Interpretation—Sixth Circuit Employs Clear Statement Rule 
in Holding That the Help America Vote Act Does Not Require States to Count Provisional 
Ballots Cast Outside Voters’ Home Precincts, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2461, 2467 (2005). 
 21. Id. at 2466. 
 22. 5 Stat. 491 (1842).  
 23. 14 Stat. 243 (1866). 
 24. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006) (prohibiting infringement of civil rights 
during the voting process); 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (enforcing the anti-racial 
discrimination guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment).  
 25. 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
 26. Id. § 1. 
 27. Id. § 8. 
 28. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997).   
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1. What can Congress “make or alter?”  
The Supreme Court first interpreted the Elections Clause in its 
1879 ruling in Ex parte Siebold.29  There, the Court found that the 
Clause’s “make or alter” language implied a broad grant of 
congressional authority over the regulation of House and Senate 
elections.30  Although the Elections Clause created concurrent 
authority between the states and the federal government to regulate 
congressional elections, the Court made it clear that Congress’s 
authority in this area was “paramount.”31 
With Siebold laying the foundation for Elections Clause 
jurisprudence, the Court has since embraced a broad grant of 
congressional authority over federal elections.  For instance, in its 
1932 opinion in Smiley v. Holm,32 the Court re-emphasized Congress’s 
power to supplant state election regulations as it deemed necessary.33  
More recently, in the 1997 case of Foster v. Love,34 the Court held that 
a federal law mandating the date when general elections for the 
House and Senate must be held trumped a Louisiana state law that 
provided for a different election day.35 
Federal courts have also emphasized that the Election Clause’s 
“make or alter” language is significant.  In the 1997 case Ass’n of 
Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Miller,36 the State of 
Michigan argued that Congress, similar to its authority under the 
Commerce Clause, had no power to compel state action where a state 
had already established its own election regulations.37  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected this position, 
holding that while the Commerce Clause only allows Congress to make 
laws pertaining to interstate commerce, the Elections Clause 
expressly allows Congress to make and to alter election regulations.38  
Therefore, the Elections Clause allows Congress to compel state 
                                                          
 29. 100 U.S. 371 (1879). 
 30. See id. at 384 (“When exercised, the action of Congress, so far as it extends 
and conflicts with the regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes them.”). 
 31. Id. at 385. 
 32. 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
 33. See id. at 366–67 (noting that Congress can make both its own elections 
regulations and alter pre-existing state legislation, including being able to impose 
additional sanctions or penalties beyond those that states have authorized). 
 34. 522 U.S. 67 (1997). 
 35. See id. at 69 (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832–33 
(1995)) (reaffirming that it is “well-settled that the Elections Clause grants Congress 
‘the power to override state regulations’ by establishing uniform rules for federal 
elections, binding on the States”).  
 36. 129 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 37. Id. at 836–37.  
 38. Id. at 836.  
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action even where states have previously enacted contrary 
regulations.39 
2. What are “such regulations,” and how may Congress regulate the 
 “[t]imes, [p]laces, and [m]anner” of holding federal elections? 
In addition to interpreting the extent of Congress’s power to make 
and alter federal elections regulations, federal courts also have 
discussed the types of regulations that fall under this broad grant of 
congressional authority.  In Smiley, the Supreme Court found that the 
vague phrase “such regulations” allowed Congress to regulate 
anything “of the same general character” as the more specific time, 
place, and manner regulations outlined in the Elections Clause.40  
The Court found that Congress could establish a “complete code for 
congressional elections . . . [because Congress] has a general 
supervisory power over the whole subject” of regulating national 
elections.41  More recently, in Millsaps v. Thompson,42 the Sixth Circuit 
held that the Elections Clause afforded Congress the power to 
regulate essentially all procedural aspects of congressional elections.43  
Stated succinctly, courts have concluded that there is “national 
authority over national elections.”44 
Beyond the generic “such regulations” wording, courts have 
interpreted specific words within the Elections Clause, including both 
“times” and “manner.”  In Foster, the Supreme Court considered 
whether Louisiana could hold its federal elections on a day other 
than the one proscribed by federal law.45  The Court overturned the 
Louisiana law and held that the “times” provision in the Elections 
                                                          
 39. See id. (noting that the Elections Clause provides an affirmative grant of 
power to Congress beyond that found in provisions like the Commerce Clause). 
 40. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). 
 41. See id. at 366–67 (citations omitted) (concluding that regulations pertaining 
to, inter alia, voter registration, fraud prevention, corruption mitigation, and 
tabulating of election results are included in this “complete code”).  But see U.S. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 834–35 (1995) (listing approved state 
regulations of election procedures). 
 42. 259 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 43. See id. at 538–40 (framing its conclusion by couching Elections Clause case 
law in terms of the Framers’ intent). 
 44. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 119 n.2 (1970), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.  Mitchell also posits that Congress’s Elections 
Clause power to regulate national elections “is augmented by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.”  Id. at 120.  
 45. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 68–69 (1997).  Federal law sets the first Tuesday 
following the first Monday in November of even-numbered years as “Election Day,” 
on which elections are held for all members of the House of Representatives and for 
approximately one-third of the U.S. Senate.  2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 (2006).  Louisiana law 
had established an “open primary” system in which, essentially, these federal offices 
could be filled through an election a month earlier.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
18:402(B)(1) (2004).  
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Clause clearly authorized Congress to mandate uniform dates for 
federal elections.46   
The term “manner” has presented a more difficult problem for 
courts.  In its 1921 decision Newberry v. United States,47 a divided 
Supreme Court construed the term narrowly, holding that regulating 
the “manner” of elections did not empower Congress to control party 
primaries or conventions.48  Yet, one concurring justice in Newberry 
immediately questioned this narrow reading of “manner” and called 
Congress’s power to regulate elections “plenary.”49  In 2001, the 
Supreme Court suggested that it now agrees with that then-minority 
opinion when, in Cook v. Gralike,50 it found that valid “manner” 
regulations are those pertaining to any procedural element of 
holding elections.51 
C. The Move to Popular Election of U.S. Senators 
Under the original Constitution, state legislatures elected U.S. 
Senators.52  In 1913, the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment 
shifted that responsibility directly to the people of each state by 
compelling the direct election of Senators.53  This section will explore 
the events leading up to this fundamental shift, trace the legislative 
                                                          
 46. Foster, 522 U.S. at 69; see also ACLU of Ohio, Inc. v. Taft, 385 F.3d 641, 650 
(6th Cir. 2004) (finding constitutional a federal law regulating the timing of how 
states must fill vacant House seats); Fox v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 431, 437 
(W.D.N.Y. 2010) (validating a federal law requiring states to decide for themselves 
the timing of certain special elections for the House); supra notes 34–35 and 
accompanying text (discussing Foster’s holding that federal election regulations 
trump state election regulations when they conflict with one another so long as the 
applicable federal regulation pertains to the times, places, or manner of holding 
elections for federal offices). 
 47. 256 U.S. 232 (1921), abrogated by Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 
U.S. 534 (1934). 
 48. Id. at 258.  The Court concluded that “the fair intendment of the words 
[‘manner of holding elections’] does not extend so far” as to include authorizing 
congressional control over electoral processes that are distinct from the actual 
elections for federal offices.  Id.   
 49. See id. at 268 (White, C.J., concurring) (explaining that this broad grant of 
authority was at the very heart of the debate at the time of the Framing). 
 50. 531 U.S. 510 (2001). 
 51. Id. at 523–24.  The Court identified these procedural elements as, among 
other things, voter registration, vote counting, voter canvassing, and publishing 
election.  Id.; cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Cook v. Gralike:  Easy Cases and Structural Reasoning, 
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 310 (2002) (positing that the result of Cook would have been 
the same even without applying the Elections Clause to the questioned state law). 
 52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913) (emphasis added) (“The 
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, 
chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one vote.”).  
 53. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (emphasis added) (“The Senate of the United 
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, 
for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.”).  
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history of the Seventeenth Amendment, discuss case law interpreting 
certain provisions of the Amendment, and examine the reemergence 
of the direct election of Senators as a modern political issue. 
1. In the beginning:  State legislatures’ selection of U.S. Senators 
As originally drafted and ratified, Article I, Section 3 ensured states 
an integral role in the federal government by requiring each state 
legislature to directly select a state’s delegation to the U.S. Senate.54  
The Framers’ intent was that this structure would both guarantee 
states’ active participation in the nascent republic55 and, in contrast to 
the House of Representatives, insulate the Senate from the whims of 
a fickle populace.56 
This system faltered in the 1850s when the national tension leading 
up to the Civil War spilled over into the state legislatures’ selection of 
Senators, causing several Senate seats to remain vacant for extended 
periods.57  These problems continued and intensified after the Civil 
War,58 eventually prompting Congress to pass a law in 1866 
mandating how and when each state legislature needed to select its 
U.S. Senators.59  Yet problems persisted, including widespread bribery 
and corruption.60  Moreover, general deadlock continued in some 
                                                          
 54. See RALPH A. ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE SEVENTEENTH 
AMENDMENT:  THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, 93–94 (2001) (describing 
the Framers’ vision of the Senate as being designed to protect states’ autonomy); see 
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (extolling the virtues of the 
constitutional framework for the Senate, including how its members were chosen). 
 55. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 96–100 (detailing how state legislatures’ 
“instructions” to sitting Senators provided for the direct representation of state 
interests in the Senate).  
 56. See Direct Election of Senators, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/ 
common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm, (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) 
[hereinafter U.S. Senate webpage] (suggesting that the impact of state legislatures’ 
election of U.S. senators would be to insulate the senators from the temperamental 
general public).  
 57. Id.  For instance, a conflict between Southern Democrats and Northern 
Republicans in Indiana left one of the state’s Senate seats vacant for two years.  Id.  
But see ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 181 (suggesting that the original method of 
selecting Senators worked well for the first hundred years after the ratification of the 
Constitution). 
 58. See U.S. Senate webpage, supra note 56 (noting the Civil War’s exacerbating 
effect on the problems of filling Senate vacancies).  Most notable among the various 
conflicts in state legislatures was the case of Senator John Stockton in New Jersey, 
whose Senate appointment was challenged because the New Jersey legislature 
“elected” him with only a plurality of the votes.  See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 185–86 
(discussing the calamity that ensued in the Senate after New Jersey sent Stockton to 
the chamber, and its role in the body’s intense debate surrounding civil rights for 
newly-freed slaves in the South).   
 59. See 14 Stat. 243 (1866) (requiring each chamber of state legislatures to meet 
on a prescribed day to fill a vacant U.S. Senate seat and to continue meeting every 
subsequent day until that seat was filled). 
 60. See U.S. Senate webpage, supra note 56 (noting that nine cases of bribery were 
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state legislatures,61 causing forty-five deadlocks and numerous delayed 
seatings in twenty different states from 1891 until 1905.62 
Proposed solutions for fixing the way Senators were appointed 
were as old as the problem itself.63  However, the push for directly 
electing Senators did not gain substantial momentum until the latter 
part of the nineteenth century, when the Progressive movement 
adopted it as a cause célèbre.64  Despite this popular demand for direct 
election of Senators,65 Congress, especially the Senate, persistently 
resisted such a structural change.66   
Prompted by this lack of congressional action, some states acted 
independently to bring about direct election of their U.S. Senators.67  
By 1912, twenty-nine states had adopted a direct or quasi-direct 
method to elect their Senators.68  As a result, the Senate gradually was 
filled with Senators who were beneficiaries of, and therefore 
supporters of, the direct election of all Senators.69  Because of this, 
institutional support in Congress eventually shifted in favor of a 
national change in the process of electing U.S. Senators.70 
                                                          
publicized between 1866 and 1906).  But see C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS 
DEMOCRACY:  ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 180 (1995) 
(arguing that allegations of corruption were overblown because they were made 
against only fifteen out of the 1,180 Senators elected by state legislatures between 
1789 and 1909). 
 61. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 187–90 (charting the instances of deadlock in 
state legislatures during that era). 
 62. See U.S. Senate webpage, supra note 56 (discussing how deadlocks and vacancies 
continued after Congress’s 1866 attempt at reform and into the twentieth century).   
Delaware was home to perhaps the most egregious example of this deadlock.  There, 
quarrels in the state legislature kept a Senate seat vacant for four years from 1899–
1903.  Id. 
 63. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 183 (stating that the first proposal for direct 
election of U.S. Senators was in 1826). 
 64. See HOEBEKE supra note 60, at 151–54 (characterizing the involvement of the 
Progressives in pushing for direct election of Senators, including efforts by such well-
known Progressives as Wisconsin’s Robert La Follette). 
 65. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 183 (suggesting that the public associated direct 
election of Senators with the overall goals of government reform, and that this 
prompted a strong call for change among the voting populace). 
 66. See id. at 183 (noting that, in total, Congress considered and rejected 187 
direct election resolutions before approving the Seventeenth Amendment).  The 
House actually passed six of those proposals before the Senate finally followed suit in 
1912.  Id. 
 67. See U.S. Senate webpage, supra note 56 (stating that Oregon led the way in 
adopting this approach, with Nebraska following several years later). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See HOEBEKE, supra note 60, at 149–50 (noting that, by 1909, states’ efforts in 
instituting their own direct elections of Senators had “tilt[ed] the balance in the 
Senate” so that a majority of its members now supported direct election). 
 70. See id. at 157–61 (discussing how the pro-direct election Senators were able to 
subvert their opponents’ stalling tactics by using parliamentary tools to assure that 
proposed constitutional amendments had hearings before Senate committees 
sympathetic to the goal of directly electing Senators). 
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2. A major shift:  The Seventeenth Amendment’s legislative history 
In early 1911, Representative William Waller Rucker introduced 
House Joint Resolution 39 (H.J. Res. 39),71 a proposed constitutional 
amendment requiring the direct election of all U.S. Senators.72  In 
addition, H.J. Res. 39 contained a provision that would have 
eliminated Congress’s Elections Clause authority over Senate 
elections.73  After defeating an amendment that would have removed 
this provision,74 the House of Representatives passed H.J. Res. 39 with 
the two-thirds majority required for a constitutional amendment.75 
Days later, the Senate began to consider H.J. Res. 39 by referring it 
to the Judiciary Committee.76  Just months before, the Judiciary 
Committee considered a virtually identical constitutional proposal;77 
the Committee reported out that proposal favorably to the whole 
Senate.78  In its Majority Report, the Committee discussed the reasons 
for, and advantages of, amending the Constitution in such a 
significant way.79  A chief reason it cited was to unshackle state 
legislatures from the time-consuming (and often deadlock-
producing) process of selecting Senators.80  Similarly, the Majority 
Report found that direct election would end the frequent Senate 
vacancies that resulted from deadlocked legislatures.81  Additionally, 
the Report cited the possibility (and confirmed instances) of 
corruption during the selection of Senators as yet another reason to 
amend the then-existing process of legislative appointment.82  Finally, 
the Report concluded that direct election of Senators was the best 
way to further the goals of democratic representation and to align the 
Constitution with the era’s prevailing public opinion, which 
                                                          
 71. H.J. Res. 39, 62d Cong. (1911). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 208–11 (noting that H.J. Res. 39 provided for 
“stipulated state control of elections”). 
 74. See id. at 211 (describing the parallels between Representative Horace Olin 
Young’s proposed amendment and the Sutherland Amendment introduced in the 
61st Congress, which left Congress’s Elections Clause powers intact for Senate 
elections). 
 75. Id. at 211; see also U.S. CONST. art. V (detailing the process for amending the 
Constitution).  
 76. ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 211. 
 77. S.J. Res. 134, 61st Cong. (1911). 
 78. S. REP. NO. 61-961 (1911). 
 79. Id. at 13–15. 
 80. See id. at 13 (speculating that states would be freer to take up the important 
business of state governance if unburdened with the task of selecting U.S. Senators). 
 81. See id. (noting that over a dozen Senate seats had been left vacant over the 
past two decades due to deadlocked legislatures). 
 82. See id. at 14 (positing that direct elections are easier to keep free from 
corruption than the process of having legislatures select U.S. Senators). 
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overwhelmingly favored popular election of Senators.83 
One aspect of the resolution not discussed in the Majority Report, 
however, was the provision that would have stripped Congress of its 
Elections Clause powers in the arena of Senate elections.84  A minority 
of Senate Judiciary Committee members strongly objected to this 
change and issued their own Report five months after the Committee 
published the Majority Report.85  The Minority Report noted that 
altering the Elections Clause would mark a significant change to the 
constitutional structure envisioned by the Framers.86  The Minority 
Report found this change to be untenable and unwise, fearing that it 
would result in a severe abrogation of federal power over federal 
elections.87 
Accordingly, before the Senate considered H.J. Res. 39, Senator 
Joseph Bristow offered a substitute resolution that omitted the 
Elections Clause reference contained in the House version.88  A block 
of Southern Senators opposed the omission, citing concerns over 
federal control of Senate elections.89  However, the Senate ultimately 
passed the Bristow Amendment, but only after the Vice President—
acting in his constitutional role as President of the Senate90—cast a 
tie-breaking vote in its favor.91  Later the same day, the amended 
resolution passed the Senate with the requisite two-thirds majority 
vote.92 
Because the Senate passed an amended resolution, the issue 
returned to the House,93 where debate raged on about whether states 
or the federal government should have the final word in regulating 
                                                          
 83. See id. at 14–15 (arguing that support for popular election was “almost 
unanimous”). 
 84. See generally S. REP. NO. 61-961 (1911) (omitting any reference to the 
proposal’s Elections Clause ramifications). 
 85. See S. REP. NO. 62-35 (1911) (dissenting from the Committee’s Majority 
Report as to the clause granting exclusive elections regulation power over Senate 
elections to the states). 
 86. See id. at 2 (asserting that, had the original Constitution called for direct 
election of Senators, it also would have extended Congress’s Elections Clause 
authority to those elections). 
 87. See id. at 2–4 (finding that altering the Elections Clause was unnecessary to 
achieve the goals of direct Senate elections and that maintaining federal oversight of 
all elections was more important than changing how Senators were elected). 
 88. ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 211. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3 (explaining that the Vice President serves as the 
President of the Senate, but that he may cast a vote only when it is necessary to break 
a tie). 
 91. ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 211. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (setting forth the process by which a bill becomes a 
law). 
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Senate elections.94  On a party-line vote pitting the Northern 
Republicans, who favored federal control, against the Southern 
Democrats, who advocated for “states’ rights,” the House rejected the 
Bristow Amendment.95  This created the need for a Conference 
Committee to reconcile the differences between the House and 
Senate versions of the proposed amendment.96 
For nearly a year, the Conference Committee was unable to reach 
an agreement.97  Frustrated by this lack of progress, the Senate urged 
the House to accept the Bristow Amendment.98  By this time, even 
Representative Rucker, the author of the original H.J. Res. 39 that 
granted states exclusive regulatory power over Senate elections, urged 
his House colleagues to support the Bristow Amendment.99  Still, the 
Southern Democrats in the House continued to vehemently protest 
this change, even offering their own last-minute amendment to keep 
the federal government out of Senate elections.100  That amendment 
failed when many members of Congress, who were sympathetic to the 
Southern Democrats’ views, concluded that the Bristow Amendment 
was the only way to bring about the direct election of Senators, a goal 
these members were not willing to sacrifice.101  Consequently, the 
House of Representatives passed the Bristow Amendment with a two-
thirds majority on May 13, 1912, preserving federal oversight of 
Senate elections and giving the Amendment the necessary majority in 
both chambers of Congress.102   
Per Article V of the U.S. Constitution, the support of three-fourths 
of the states was next required to ratify the proposal.103  This process 
happened exceedingly fast,104 and, with Connecticut’s vote to ratify, 
                                                          
 94. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 212 (providing examples of both positions). 
 95. See id. (noting that the final tally was 171–111 against the Bristow 
Amendment). 
 96. See id. (discussing the process by which the Vice President, serving as 
President of the Senate, appointed conferees to a special Conference Committee 
tasked with reconciling the differences between the House and Senate versions of 
the prospective constitutional amendment). 
 97. See HOEBEKE, supra note 60, at 189 (explaining that Congress was deadlocked 
for eleven months after the Senate passed the Bristow Amendment). 
 98. See id. (stating that the Senate “resisted the temptation to reverse itself,” 
instead opting to “[weary] the House into submission”). 
 99. ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 213. 
 100. See id. (detailing Representative Charles Bartlett’s amendment, which would 
have set strict limits on how Congress could regulate Senate elections). 
 101. See id. (noting that Representative Bartlett’s amendment failed 189 to 89). 
 102. See id. at 213–14 (The Bristow Amendment passed the House 238 to 39.). 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 104. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 214 (noting the Seventeenth Amendment’s 
ratification took less than eleven months; only the Twelfth Amendment had been 
approved quicker).  The Twenty-Sixth Amendment eclipsed the Seventeenth 
Amendment’s record-setting pace by securing ratification in just under four months.  
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the Seventeenth Amendment was officially enshrined in the U.S. 
Constitution on April 8, 1913.105 
3. The states’ remaining power in the selection of U.S. Senators:  The 
 Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy-filling clause 
In addition to compelling the direct election of Senators, the 
Seventeenth Amendment also prescribes how Senate vacancies are to 
be filled.106  In its 2010 decision in Judge v. Quinn,107 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit labeled and defined the 
various parts of the Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy-filling 
language:  the principal clause, which outlines the basic method for 
filling Senate vacancies; the proviso, which allows for temporary 
Senate appointments until a direct election can be held; and the “as 
the legislature may direct” clause, which modifies the term “election” 
in the proviso.108  To facilitate easier understanding, this Comment 
will adopt the Seventh Circuit’s labels. 
a. Vacancy-Filling:  The principal clause 
The principal clause of the vacancy-filling language states that 
“[w]hen vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the 
Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of 
election to fill such vacancies.”109  The first part of that clause is simply 
conditional, meaning that a Senate seat must first become vacant for 
the rest of the clause to have any effect.110   
The second part of the principal clause articulates the result of that 
condition.111  It compels governors to issue writs of election so that 
the vacant seat will be filled through a direct vote of the people.112  
The use of the word “shall” in the Amendment means that this clause 
imposes a mandatory obligation on governors.113   
                                                          
Id. at 229 n.143. 
 105. Id. at 214.  Interestingly, Delaware initially voted against ratification of the 
Seventeenth Amendment.  See HOEBEKE, supra  note 60, at 189 (noting that only 
Delaware and Utah rejected the Amendment).  However, the Delaware Legislature 
reversed course in 2010, finally ratifying the Amendment some ninety-seven years 
later.  Doug Denison, Senate Takes Up 17th Amendment, Finally, DOVER POST (June 24, 
2010, 5:06 PM), http://www.doverpost.com/newsnow/x41604488/Senate-takes-up-
17th-amendment-finally. 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, para. 2. 
 107. 612 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
 108. Id. at 547–51. 
 109. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, para. 2. 
 110. Judge, 612 F.3d at 547. 
 111. See id. (describing the chain of events triggered when the condition is met). 
 112. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, para. 2. 
 113. See Judge, 612 F.3d at 547 (discussing the plain meaning of “shall”).  An 
earlier Seventh Circuit decision concluded that the language in Article I, Section 2, 
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b. Vacancy-Filling:  The proviso 
A proviso acts as an exception to a general rule.114  The 
Seventeenth Amendment’s proviso immediately follows its principal 
clause:  “Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the 
executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people 
fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.”115  As a 
proviso, this language acts as a limited exception to the general 
vacancy-filling procedures outlined in the principal clause by allowing 
state governors to temporarily fill a Senate seat until a direct election 
can be held.116   
Taken together, then, the principal clause and proviso establish the 
following sequence when a Senate seat is vacated:  (1) a state’s 
governor issues a writ of election; (2) the governor, if authorized by 
state law, may temporarily appoint someone to fill the vacant Senate 
seat until an election can be held; and (3) the state holds a popular 
vote to permanently fill the vacancy.117   
However, the proviso concludes with a modifying clause118—“as the 
legislature may direct.”119  The Seventh Circuit’s first Judge opinion 
found that the phrase only modified the word “election,” which 
immediately precedes it.120  However, it is unclear whether this five-
word clause also affected Congress’s Elections Clause authority.  A 
thorough analysis of that question follows in Part III.121 
4. Interpreting the Seventeenth Amendment 
Within eight years of its ratification, the Supreme Court tackled the 
                                                          
which uses the term “shall,” was “mandatory according to the ordinary meaning of its 
terms . . . render[ing] the issuing of the writs an indispensable duty.”  Jackson v. 
Ogilvie, 426 F.2d 1333, 1336 (7th Cir. 1970).  The Seventh Circuit also noted that the 
vacancy-filling language in the Seventeenth Amendment rendered the Senate and 
House vacancy-filling procedures “functionally identical.”  Judge, 612 F.3d at 547.  But 
see Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 393 U.S. 1124 
(1969) (per curiam) (holding that “the House vacancy provision can give us no aid 
in construing the Seventeenth Amendment”).    
 114. See LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 136 (2008) 
(stating that provisos “limit the effect of a statutory provision”). 
 115. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, ¶ 2 (emphasis in original). 
 116. See Judge, 612 F.3d at 547–48 (discussing governors’ temporary appointment 
power under the Seventeenth Amendment). 
 117. Id. at 554. 
 118. See id. at 549 (attempting to discern what part of the Seventeenth 
Amendment the phrase “as the legislature may direct” modifies). 
 119. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, ¶ 2. 
 120. See Judge, 612 F.3d at 550 (holding that the phrase is “best read” in this 
narrow way).  In doing so, the court followed the rule of the last antecedent, which 
compels judges to find that limiting clauses, such as “as the legislature may direct,” 
only narrowly modify the word or phrase that they immediately follow.  Id.  
 121. See infra Part II.B (concluding that Congress can, in fact, regulate special 
Senate elections pursuant to its Elections Clause authority). 
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Seventeenth Amendment in Newberry v. United States.122  There, the 
Court considered whether an anti-corruption statute that placed 
certain campaign spending limits on prospective federal candidates 
was a valid “manner” regulation under the Elections Clause.123  In 
reaching its decision in Newberry, the Court reiterated that the 
Elections Clause was the source of Congress’s elections authority.124  
Further, the Court held that the Seventeenth Amendment had not 
altered the previously-accepted constitutional definition of 
“election”125 and that the Elections Clause remained “intact and 
applicable” to Senate elections.126   
The Court also noted that a provision altering the Elections Clause 
was present when the Senate Judiciary Committee first reported out 
the bill that would become the Seventeenth Amendment.127  
However, that language was excluded from the final version passed by 
Congress and ratified by the states.128  Because of this omission, the 
Court concluded that Congress both considered and rejected the 
notion of granting states exclusive authority to regulate Senate 
elections.129 
In the 1968 case Valenti v. Rockefeller,130 a federal district court 
analyzed the Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy-filling provisions.131  
In Valenti, several New York voters sued the Governor in the 
aftermath of the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.132  These 
voters argued that the Seventeenth Amendment required the Senate 
vacancy created by Senator Kennedy’s death to be filled through a 
popular vote in the November 1968 general election.133  A contrary 
                                                          
 122. 256 U.S. 232 (1921). 
 123. Id. at 247.  
 124. Id. at 248.  
 125. See id. at 250 (defining an “election” as the “final choice of an officer by the 
duly qualified electors”). 
 126. Id. at 252 (citing 46 CONG. REC. 848 (1911)). 
 127. See id. (citing S.J. Res. 134, 61st Cong. (1911)) (noting that the original 
legislation included the phrase “[t]he times, places and manner of holding elections 
for Senators shall be as prescribed in each state by the Legislature thereof”).  The 
Court stated that the “avowed purpose” of such language was to halt Congress’s 
power to regulate Senate elections.  Id. 
 128. See id. at 253 (discussing how the pertinent language was removed upon the 
recommendation of a minority of members of the Senate Judiciary Committee). 
 129. See id. at 253–54 (suggesting that the omission of the original language that 
would have given sole authority to the states was indicative of Congress’s intent to 
leave the Elections Clause’s authority in place for Senate elections).  For a more 
detailed discussion of this legislative history, see supra Part I.C.2. 
 130. 292 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 393 U.S. 1124 (1969) (per curiam). 
 131. See id. at 862 (stating that the court was “mindful that no court [had] 
previously construed the Amendment’s vacancy provision”). 
 132. Id. at 853. 
 133. Id. 
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state statute set November 1970 as the appropriate date for a popular 
election to fill that vacancy.134  Until that date, New York law allowed 
the Governor to temporarily appoint someone to the Senate.135  The 
plaintiffs argued that the two-year delay in holding a Senate election 
was not a “temporary appointment” as required by the Seventeenth 
Amendment.136   
The court disagreed, holding that New York’s vacancy-filling law 
was within “the discretion conferred on the states by the Seventeenth 
Amendment with respect to the timing of vacancy elections.”137  The 
court grounded its decision in an Elections Clause analysis, finding 
that New York’s law was a permissible exercise of states’ initial 
“[t]imes, [p]laces, and [m]anner” authority under that provision.138  
Furthermore, the court held that the Seventeenth Amendment left 
the Elections Clause unaltered as to vacancy-filling elections.139  In a 
per curiam decision, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the 
lower court’s ruling in Valenti.140 
In the early 1990s, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit analyzed the Seventeenth Amendment in Trinsey v. 
Pennsylvania.141  Like Valenti, this case followed the tragic death of a 
sitting Senator.142  A prospective candidate for that then-vacant Senate 
seat sued the state’s Governor, asserting that Pennsylvania’s law 
allowing political parties—rather than a popular vote—to nominate 
Senate candidates violated his Seventeenth Amendment rights.143  
                                                          
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 854. 
 138. See id. at 856 (discussing how a “natural reading” of the Seventeenth 
Amendment compels an application of the Elections Clause). 
 139. See id. (commenting that had the drafters of the Amendment wanted to 
radically alter the Election Clause’s application to vacancy-filling elections, they 
would have applied the same type of clear language used to change how Senators 
were elected).  But see id. at 862 (suggesting that the Seventeenth Amendment left 
discretion over vacancy-filling election procedures solely to the states).  Notably, this 
would be a stark departure from the traditional understanding of the Elections 
Clause, which courts have found to be a default provision granting states regulatory 
authority over elections only insofar as Congress has declined to act.  See, e.g., Foster 
v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (noting Congress’s preemptory power under the 
Elections Clause). 
 140. Valenti v. Rockefeller, 393 U.S. 405 (1969) (per curiam). 
 141. 941 F.2d 224 (3rd Cir. 1991).  This case has been discussed extensively in 
scholarly work.  See, e.g., Kevin M. Gold, Trinsey v. Pennsylvania:  State Discretion to 
Regulate United States Senate Vacancy Elections and the Standards for Judicial Scrutiny, 2 
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 199, 212–18 (1992–1993) (analyzing the impact of the Trinsey 
decision on state Senate vacancy-filling laws). 
 142. See Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 225 (discussing how Senator John Heinz died in a 
plane crash in early 1991). 
 143. Id. at 226. 
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The court disagreed, finding that the Seventeenth Amendment did 
not require states to hold primary elections before a general election 
to fill a Senate vacancy.144   
To reach this conclusion, the court considered the Seventeenth 
Amendment’s legislative history but found that it lacked significant 
discussion about the Amendment’s vacancy-filling provision.145  
Consequently, the court turned to precedent, including Valenti, to 
infer that the Seventeenth Amendment left states the discretion to 
determine the electoral procedures for filling Senate vacancies.146  
Furthermore, the court noted that the vacancy-filling provision in the 
Seventeenth Amendment twice referred to state legislatures, 
indicating Congress’s intent to allow states to determine how they fill 
Senate vacancies.147  Accordingly, the Third Circuit upheld 
Pennsylvania’s law.148 
The recent Rod Blagojevich fiasco in Illinois brought the 
Seventeenth Amendment back to federal court in 2010.  In its first 
Judge opinion, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the 
Seventeenth Amendment required Illinois’s Governor to issue writs 
of election to fill a Senate vacancy, or whether state law mandating 
the precise date of a special Senate election was sufficient to meet the 
commands of the Amendment.149  In deciding that question, the 
court extensively examined the Seventeenth Amendment’s vacancy-
filling provision.150   
                                                          
 144. Id. at 234. 
 145. See id. at 231 (noting the court’s surprise at the comparative lack of legislative 
history pertaining to sudden vacancies, which provided “no guidance . . . as to the 
course to be followed in the present circumstance”).     
 146. See id. at 233 (citing Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968)) (insisting that “as the legislature may direct” was clear evidence that the 
drafters of the Seventeenth Amendment intended to let states choose their own 
vacancy-filling elections procedures). 
 147. See id. at 234 (speculating that even though certain lawmakers failed in their 
attempts to overturn Congress’s general Election Clause authority, the Seventeenth 
Amendment’s emphasis on state legislatures in its vacancy-filling provision is 
“dispositive” evidence that states are empowered as regulators of special Senate 
elections).  However, this language was used only to justify the court’s finding that 
legislatures, not governors, had the ultimate authority to enact a statute providing for 
temporary Senate appointments if a vacancy occurred.  See id. (discussing the role 
legislatures play in empowering governors to temporarily appoint someone to the 
Senate). 
 148. Id. at 236. 
 149. See Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the 
plaintiffs had preserved their right to appeal whether it was constitutionally required 
for Illinois Governor Pat Quinn to issue writs of election for the state’s pending 
Senate vacancy, and if so, whether he was required to hold that election on the 
earliest date possible), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).  
 150. Id. at 547–55; see also supra Part I.C.3 (outlining the structure and labels 
adopted by the Seventh Circuit). 
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Through this exhaustive look into the Amendment, the court 
found that, inter alia, states’ power to regulate special Senate elections 
was still rooted in, and limited by, the Elections Clause.151  Thus, the 
court found that the Seventeenth Amendment “was not intended to 
change the Elections Clause of the original Constitution.”152  
Therefore, the Seventeenth Amendment, in concert with the 
Elections Clause, requires that states enact procedures for vacancy-
filling Senate elections.153  In Illinois, the legislature met its 
Seventeenth Amendment obligations by mandating a specific 
election day for any vacancy-filling Senate elections;154 however, the 
Seventh Circuit also found that the Governor was required to issue 
formal writs of election to meet his obligations under the 
Amendment.155 
The Seventh Circuit quickly reaffirmed this ruling in the 
subsequent case of Judge v. Quinn,156 in which Roland Burris 
challenged a district court-ordered permanent injunction—issued in 
response to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in the first Judge v. Quinn—
compelling Illinois to hold a special Senate election on a specified 
date.157  Senator Burris asserted that Illinois state law violated his 
constitutional rights by excluding his name from the ballot in the 
primary election to determine candidates in the 2010 Senate general 
election.158  With little discussion, the court found that the Illinois law 
was within the permissible realm of state action authorized by the 
Seventeenth Amendment and the Elections Clause, a result 
consistent with its previous ruling on the district court’s injunction.159 
                                                          
 151. See Judge, 612 F.3d at 550 (noting that the Seventeenth Amendment is not the 
only source of state authority to promulgate rules for filling Senate vacancies; 
instead, the Elections Clause lays the foundation for all elections regulations). 
 152. See id. at 552–53 (noting that because the Seventeenth Amendment was 
added to the Constitution after the Elections Clause, it could have expressly modified 
that earlier provision). 
 153. See id. at 554 (summarizing states’ obligations under the Elections Clause). 
 154. See id. at 541 (affirming the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ requested 
injunction). 
 155. See id. at 554–55 (clarifying that even if he lacked any discretion over when to 
hold a special election, the Governor was required to issue writs of election because 
they gave formal notice to voters, set the electoral process in motion, and ensured 
that the special election would actually occur on the prescribed day).   
 156. Judge v. Quinn, 624 F.3d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 2010).   
 157. Id.  
 158. See id. at 360–61 (noting that Roland Burris failed to support his claim that 
his non-appearance on the ballot was an actionable constitutional violation). 
 159. See id. at 359 (discerning that the phrase “as the legislature may direct” and 
the Elections Clause connote ample discretion upon states to enact election 
regulations like the disputed Illinois law). 
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5. Debate over the Seventeenth Amendment today 
Nearly a century after ratification, the controversy concerning 
certain provisions of the Seventeenth Amendment has reemerged as 
a hotly-debated political topic.160  This surprising renaissance includes 
debate over two distinct provisions of the Amendment.  First, the 
conservative-leaning Tea Party movement has called for a return to 
the era of state legislatures selecting U.S. Senators.  Second, 
embarrassing political scandals and the fear of a mass-casualty 
terrorist attack wiping out large numbers of elected officials has 
prompted general concern over how Senate vacancies are filled.  
Both issues are discussed below. 
a. The Tea Party’s push to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment 
In early 2009, a conservative political movement called the “Tea 
Party” emerged on the national political stage.161  Among other 
goals,162 the Tea Party generally supports what it believes is a strict 
adherence to the structure of federalism outlined in the Constitution, 
which Tea Party supporters assert only delegates limited enumerated 
powers to the federal government and leaves everything else to the 
discretion of the states.163  During the 2010 election season, some Tea 
Party supporters used this “states’ rights” platform to call for the 
repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment.164  At least two Tea Party-
backed congressional candidates pledged to support repeal if 
                                                          
 160. See Matt Bai, Tea Party’s Push on Senate Election Exposes Limits, N.Y. TIMES, June 
2, 2010, at A4 (noting that this once-dormant issue made a surprising return to the 
political debates in 2010 congressional campaigns). 
 161. See Lexington, Anger Management:  Some Americans are Getting Mad as Hell, THE 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 2009, at 42 (discussing both how the Tea Party was, in part, 
spawned after an on-air rant from a “previously obscure [television] journalist,” and 
how anger over perceived “bail out[s]” of certain American industries, like banking 
and automobile manufacturing, formed the basis of the Tea Party’s political 
ideology).  
 162. See Russell Berman, Gallup:  Tea Party’s top concerns are debt, size of government, 
THE HILL (July 5, 2010, 5:45 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/news/107193-gallup-tea-partys-top-concerns-are-debt-size-of-government 
(showcasing poll results that found Tea Party supporters primarily were concerned 
about the federal budget deficit and the size of the federal government). 
 163. See Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights is Rallying Cry of Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2010, at A1 (noting how some groups in the Tea Party movement are pressuring 
lawmakers to support bills that these groups believe reflect the limited role of federal 
government required by the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional 
provisions). 
 164. See Evan McMorris-Santoro, Tea Party-Backed Repeal of the 17th Amendment Gets 
Republicans Into Trouble, TALKING POINTS MEMO (May 14, 2010, 4:13 PM), 
http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/05/tea-party-call-to-repeal-the-17th-
amendment-causing-problems-for-gop-candidates.php (describing proponents of 
repeal as “a vocal part” of the Tea Party movement, who believe repeal would 
maximize individual and state liberty). 
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elected.165  A sitting Republican member of Congress with ties to the 
Tea Party movement even introduced legislation calling for a 
constitutional convention to strike the Seventeenth Amendment and 
to restore to state legislatures the function of voting for Senators.166 
Supporters of repeal believe the Seventeenth Amendment has 
usurped the Framers’ intent that the states have an integral part in 
the functioning of the federal government.167  In the opinion of many 
affiliated with the Tea Party, the direct election of Senators has given 
Congress unfettered power over the states, which consequently has 
left states vulnerable to federal action, such as unfunded mandates.168   
Conversely, supporters of the Seventeenth Amendment have 
suggested that the Tea Party is too quick to dismiss the motivations 
behind the initial ratification of the Amendment, namely corruption 
and deadlock in state legislatures.169  These supporters argue that 
special interest groups will gain undue influence over Senators if the 
selection process is returned to state legislatures.170  Although calls for 
repeal remained an ancillary issue during the 2010 election cycle, the 
relative success of Tea Party-backed candidates in the 2010 midterm 
elections171 likely means that states’ rights, possibly including a 
                                                          
 165. See id. (identifying Republicans Steve Stivers and Vaughn Ward as 
congressional candidates who, at least initially, supported repeal of the Seventeenth 
Amendment).   
 166. See Eric Kleefeld, Gohmert:  Fight Health Care Bill by Repealing Popular Election of 
Senators, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Mar. 23, 2010, 2:21 PM), 
http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/03/gohmert-fight-health-care-bill-by-
repealing-popular-election-of-senators-video.php  (reporting on Representative 
Louie Gohmert’s plan to return Senate elections to the pre-1913 model). 
 167. See McMorris-Santoro, supra note 164 (summarizing repeal supporters’ belief 
that popular election of Senators has undermined the notion of limited federal 
government by depriving states of the power to protect their interests in 
Washington).  
 168. See Bai, supra note 160 (distilling the general pro-federalism argument 
espoused by advocates of repealing the Seventeenth Amendment); see also Tea Party’s 
Target Not Just the 17th Amendment, Add 14th as Well, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y BLOG 
(June 7, 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/tea-party’s-target-not-just-the-17th-
amendment-add-14th-as-well (noting that the Tea Party’s states’ rights platform has 
also targeted reform, or repeal, of the Fourteenth Amendment, especially as it 
pertains to birthright citizenship).  
 169. John A. Farrell, The Stupidest Tea Party Idea:  Repeal the 17th Amendment, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT THOMAS JEFFERSON ST. BLOG (June 1, 2010), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/john-farrell/2010/6/1/tea-party-goes-
overboard-by-suggesting-to-repeal-17th-amendment.html (synthesizing the 
Progressive Era arguments in support of ratifying the Seventeenth Amendment in 
1913). 
 170. See id. (arguing that the robber barons and party machines of the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries will reemerge in modern forms if state 
legislatures are again entrusted with a key role in shaping who serves in Congress). 
 171. Five candidates affiliated with Tea Party groups won seats to the U.S. Senate 
in 2010; over forty Tea Party-supported candidates were elected to the House of 
Representatives.  Alexandra Moe, Just 32% of Tea Party Candidates Win, MSNBC FIRST 
READ (Nov. 3, 2010, 4:34 PM), http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/ 
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renewed push to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment, will remain a 
contentious political topic for the foreseeable future. 
b. Current issues surrounding U.S. Senate vacancies 
Beyond the general debate over whether states or the people 
should elect U.S. Senators, a particularized debate over what should 
happen when those Senate seats become vacant also exists.  In part, 
this debate focuses on continuity of government principles, which 
deal with how the United States government would continue to 
function in the event of a major catastrophe that causes mass 
casualties among elected officials.172  Since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, government officials have been especially 
concerned with this type of contingency planning.173  In fact, these 
concerns prompted federal legislation that outlined how vacancies in 
the House of Representatives were to be filled in special 
circumstances, such as a terrorist attack.174  However, Congress has yet 
to pass a similar measure for filling Senate vacancies after a mass 
casualty event.175  Accordingly, it seems likely that Congress will one 
day attempt to address this potential deficiency in the federal 
continuity of government plan. 
Terrorism concerns notwithstanding, several high-profile Senate 
                                                          
11/03/5403120-just-32-of-tea-party-candidates-win.  
 172. See generally About the Commission, CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, 
http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/about/about.html (last visited Nov. 14, 
2011) (noting the Commission studies how to maintain the operations of all three 
federal branches of government in the event of a major terrorist attack, natural 
disaster, or some other catastrophe). 
 173. See William M. Arkin, Back to the Bunker . . . Or, How Washington Learned to Love 
the Shelter All Over Again, WASH. POST, June 4, 2006, at B1 (discussing the federal 
government’s largest-ever continuity of government drill, which was planned and 
executed because of post-9/11 concern over how the federal government would 
respond to mass casualties in an age of global terrorism). 
 174. See Michael Stern, The Constitutionality of the ELECT Act, POINT OF ORDER BLOG 
(Mar. 14, 2009, 5:13 PM), http://www.pointoforder.com/2009/03/14/the-
constitutionality-of-the-elect-act/ (discussing the vacancy-filling mechanisms in 2 
U.S.C. § 8 (2006), which provided special rules for House elections held under 
“extraordinary circumstances”).  
 175. The authority for 2 U.S.C. § 8, the House mass-casualty provision, is clearly 
grounded in the Elections Clause.  See id. (identifying the constitutional basis for the 
legislation).  However, because of the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, 
many lawmakers seem unsure of the constitutionality of similar federal legislation to 
address potential mass casualties among Senators.  See Vikram David Amar & Michael 
Schaps, The Proposal to End Gubernatorial Appointments of Replacement Senators:  Reform in 
This Area May Be Needed, But the Feingold Constitutional Amendment Needs More Thought, 
FINDLAW (Mar. 13, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20090313.html 
[hereinafter Amar & Schaps] (suggesting that questions persist over whether the 
Seventeenth Amendment precludes Congress from exercising its Elections Clause 
authority over special Senate elections); see also infra Part II.C.3 (analyzing the answer 
to those questions). 
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vacancies have generated national headlines in recent years.  The 
2008 election of President Barack Obama and Vice President Joseph 
Biden, along with President Obama’s appointment of several Cabinet 
secretaries, created four Senate vacancies in a matter of weeks.176  Less 
than a year later, Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy’s death 
created another high-profile vacancy.177 
Each of these vacancies had a unique subtext.  In Delaware, the 
Governor appointed Ted Kaufmann, a former staff member to Vice 
President Biden, to the Senate.178  At the time, political observers 
viewed Kaufman as a “seat warmer” who merely would hold Vice 
President Biden’s old seat until his son, Beau Biden, could run for a 
full term in 2010.179  In Colorado, the Governor appointed Michael 
Bennet, who was criticized because he had never before run for any 
public office.180  In New York, prominent media figures accused 
Governor David Paterson of “dithering”181 and acting “peculiar”182 
during the process that ultimately resulted in Kirsten Gillibrand’s 
                                                          
 176. See Editorial, How Not to Pick a Senator, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2009, at A12 
(listing the Senate vacancies proximately caused by President Obama’s election).  
Following the 2008 election, Illinois (vacated by Obama), Delaware (vacated by 
Biden), New York (vacated by Hillary Clinton when she was appointed Secretary of 
State), and Colorado (vacated by Ken Salazar when he was appointed Secretary of 
the Interior) all experienced sudden Senate vacancies.  Id. 
 177. See John M. Broder, Causes Defined Him, Even at End, at 77, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
27, 2009, at A1 (noting Senator Kennedy’s passing after a long struggle with brain 
cancer). 
 178. See Kate Phillips, Biden’s Replacement Sworn In to the Senate, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS 
BLOG (Jan. 16, 2009, 12:21 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/ 
bidens-replacement-sworn-in (discussing Kaufman’s official start to his brief Senate 
career). 
 179. See Will Robinson, Duke Alumnus Picked for Biden’s Senate Seat, CBS NEWS (Feb. 
11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/26/politics/uwire/ 
main4633986.shtml (noting that Kaufman announced he would not seek election to 
the full Senate term in 2010, prompting speculation that he was keeping the seat 
warm for Beau Biden).  But see Charles Mathesian, Beau Biden declines Senate Bid, 
POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/ 
0110/31952.html (reporting that Beau Biden opted not to run for his father’s old 
Senate seat in 2010). 
 180. See Steven K. Paulson, Michael Bennet Appointed Colorado Senator, Will Replace 
Ken Salazar, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 3, 2009, 8:59 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/03/michael-bennet-appointed-
_n_155009.html (discussing Colorado Governor Bill Ritter’s surprising choice of a 
“dark horse candidate” lacking legislative or campaigning experience). 
 181. See Maureen Dowd, Which Governor is Wackier?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at 
WK11 (accusing Governor Paterson of taking too long and changing his mind too 
frequently during the Senate appointment process, which included, in Dowd’s 
opinion, his poor handling of the prospective appointment of Caroline Kennedy to 
the vacant seat). 
 182. See Chris Smith, The Zany Adventures of (Senator) Caroline Kennedy, N.Y. 
MAGAZINE (Feb. 2, 2009), at 16 (criticizing Governor Paterson for the way in which 
he filled Hillary Clinton’s vacant Senate seat). 
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appointment to the Senate.183  In Massachusetts, Republican Scott 
Brown’s surprising special election win marked the national 
emergence of the Tea Party movement.184  The saga of disgraced ex-
Governor Rod Blagojevich in Illinois, however, is likely to remain the 
most infamous and egregious example of the problems surrounding 
how Senate vacancies are currently filled.185 
Motivated in part because of this noteworthy string of recent 
Senate vacancies, federal lawmakers recently introduced legislation 
addressing this issue.186  On January 29, 2009, Senators Russell 
Feingold, Mark Begich, and John McCain proposed a constitutional 
amendment to create a uniform national method for filling Senate 
vacancies.187  The proposed amendment would prevent all 
gubernatorial appointments to the Senate, instead requiring all 
sitting Senators to be elected directly by the people.188   
Just days later, Representative Aaron Schock introduced a bill 
designed to tackle the Senate vacancies problem without taking the 
drastic step to amend the U.S. Constitution.189  Unlike the Senators’ 
proposed amendment, the ELECT Act would still allow state 
governors to make temporary Senate appointments, but it would 
mandate that special vacancy-filling elections occur within ninety days 
of a seat vacancy.190  In addition, the ELECT Act would provide 
federal funding to a state to mitigate its financial burden in holding 
prompt special elections.191 
                                                          
 183. See Nicholas Sabloff, Kirsten Gillibrand:  New York’s Next Senator, HUFFINGTON 
POST, (Jan. 22, 2009, 8:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/22/ 
kirsten-gillibrand-new-yo_n_160195.html (noting how Governor Paterson settled on 
a sitting member of New York’s delegation to the House of Representatives to 
replace Hillary Clinton in the Senate). 
 184. See Charles Krauthammer, The Meaning of Brown, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, at 
A21 (opining that the Brown Senate election victory reflected the national power of 
the Tea Party to shape campaigns and to drive voter turnout). 
 185. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (chronicling the events in Illinois 
after Barack Obama vacated his Senate seat). 
 186. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 7 and H.J. Res. 21:  A Constitutional Amendment Concerning 
Senate Vacancies:  Joint Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on the Constitution and the H. 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. 12-13 (2009) 
(written testimony of Rep. Aaron Schock) (suggesting that he was motivated to 
propose federal legislation creating a uniform process for filling Senate vacancies 
because the current system is “riddled with the possibility of fraud, abuse, and 
outright bribery,” which he saw firsthand in his home state of Illinois during the 
Blagojevich saga).  
 187. S.J. Res. 7, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Compare id. (proposing a constitutional amendment to address the problem 
of Senate vacancies), with H.R. 899, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing a legislative, 
rather than constitutional, solution to the problem). 
 190. H.R. 899, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 191. Id. 
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D. Theories of Constitutional Interpretation and Statutory Construction 
This Comment utilizes the traditional tools of constitutional 
interpretation and statutory construction to analyze the apparent 
tension between portions of the Seventeenth Amendment and the 
Elections Clause.192  Accordingly, a brief introduction to the theories 
and tools that will be utilized in this Comment is in order here. 
1. Introduction to the textual approach 
Textualism is a formalistic approach to constitutional 
interpretation that relies exclusively on the ordinary meaning of the 
text of any given constitutional provision to interpret that provision’s 
meaning.193  In doing so, the textual approach dismisses virtually all 
inquiries into non-textual sources, including canons of construction 
and legislative history.194  Instead, the key question that textualists ask 
is how a reasonable person would ordinarily understand the words of 
a certain provision.195   
In a 1987 concurrence in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,196 Justice Antonin 
Scalia—perhaps the most well-known modern textualist197—
articulated his jurisprudential approach to textualism.  In Cardoza-
Fonseca, the Court ruled that the Immigration and Nationality Act 
only required asylum applicants to demonstrate a “well-founded fear 
of persecution,” which the Court found was a different and lower 
                                                          
 192. See infra Part II.B.1–3 (interpreting the text of the Seventeenth Amendment 
and Elections Clause using traditional tools of constitutional and statutory 
construction).  Constitutional provisions can be considered “super statutes,” 
meaning that, while the tools of statutory interpretation are by no means dispositive 
in analyzing constitutional amendments, their general principles are certainly 
applicable and relevant to any analysis.  RONALD B. BROWN & SHARON J. BROWN, 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:  THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 16–17 (2002). 
 193. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 14 (1991) (outlining the 
contours of the textual modality of interpretation); Ian Gallacher, Conducting the 
Constitution:  Justice Scalia, Textualism, and the Eroica Symphony, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 301, 306 (2006) (noting that “textualism requires a devotion to the text above all 
other considerations”); see also Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law 
System:  The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in 
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22 (Amy Gutmann 
ed., 1997) (defending his view of textualism by stating that “[t]he text is the law, and 
it is the text that must be observed”). 
 194. See Gallacher, supra note 193, at 307 (noting that “[any] interpretation going 
beyond the text’s meaning is impermissible”). 
 195. See BOBBITT, supra note 193, at 25–26 (demonstrating how a textual argument 
is made by analyzing Article VI in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution through 
the lens of an average contemporary American’s understanding of the text).  Bobbitt 
also refers to this as the “man on the street” approach.  Id. at 12. 
 196. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 197. See Gallacher, supra note 193, at 306–07 (bestowing upon Justice Scalia the 
title of “most influential” textualist by virtue of his position on the Supreme Court). 
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standard than the one that INS had been using.198  The majority 
opinion cited the Act’s legislative history at length in reaching its 
conclusion,199 even though the majority also felt its interpretation of 
“well-founded fear” reflected the plain meaning of that term.200  
Justice Scalia agreed with the result of the case, but he strongly 
objected to the majority’s reliance on legislative intent.201  Justice 
Scalia felt that the Court’s analysis should have ended when it 
determined the plain meaning of “well-founded fear,” rather than 
further inquiring into the law’s legislative history.202  Thus, for Justice 
Scalia, textualism was the only approach to constitutional 
interpretation needed in this case because, “[w]here the language 
of . . . laws is clear, [judges] are not free to replace it with unenacted 
legislative intent.”203 
The plain meaning theory is to statutory interpretation what 
textualism is to constitutional interpretation.204  Like textualism, the 
plain meaning approach uses the ordinary meaning of words, 
grammar, and punctuation to dictate statutory interpretation.205  
While the plain meaning approach does not look to external sources 
of interpretation, it sometimes will use dictionary meanings and 
linguistic canons of construction—those that explain how to apply 
the normal rules of the English language to the law—to discern the 
ordinary meaning of text.206 
The plain meaning approach also buttresses the canon of 
construction that disfavors creating surplusage or redundancy within 
a law.207  This canon presumes that legislators carefully draft all 
                                                          
 198. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449–50. 
 199. See id. at 434–35 (noting that the Act’s legislative history indicated that 
Congress did not seek to modify a prior standard it had been using for refugee 
determinations). 
 200. See id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that “the very language of 
the term ‘well-founded fear’” compelled the majority’s reasoning in this case). 
 201. See id. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that “well-
founded fear” had a clear, plain meaning, but imploring the Court to stop its analysis 
there rather than delving into the Act’s legislative history). 
 202. See id. (calling the Court’s legislative intent analysis “an ill-advised deviation 
from the venerable principle that if the language of a statute is clear, that language 
must be given effect—at least in the absence of patent absurdity”).  Justice Scalia 
expressed further concern that the majority’s insistence at looking into legislative 
history would be a cue to other courts that such a practice was appropriate or even 
required in all cases.  Id. at 453. 
 203. Id. at 453. 
 204. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 17 (defining the plain meaning approach as the 
statutory interpretation counterpart to textualism). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 104 (defining the canon against surplusage to mean that in a properly-
interpreted statute, “every word has meaning; nothing is redundant or 
meaningless”). 
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statutes;208 therefore, each word in a statute must have an 
independent meaning, and no words should be viewed as 
duplicative.209  The Supreme Court has validated this general 
principle by declaring that it has the “duty to give effect, if possible, 
to every clause and word of a statute.”210 
Sometimes, however, applying the plain meaning of words in a 
statute creates a result unintended by the legislature.  Hence, 
statutory interpreters have developed the absurd result exception to 
the plain meaning rule.211  The Supreme Court first articulated this 
exception in the 1892 case Holy Trinity Church v. United States,212 which 
centered on a federal anti-immigration statute banning businesses 
from bringing anyone into the country “to perform labor or service 
of any kind.”213  Consequently, when a church hired a pastor from 
England, the federal government fined the church.214  However, the 
Court rejected the lower court’s holding that the law’s application to 
work “of any kind” was clear, plain language.215  Instead, the Court 
held that denying a church the right to recruit pastors from overseas 
would be an absurd result.216  The Court famously concluded that “a 
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the 
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its 
makers.”217 This rationale opened the door for other jurists to look 
beyond the clear text of a statute when that analysis would produce a 
similarly absurd result.218  
                                                          
 208. See id. (positing that, if legislators would have found extra or useless words in 
a statute, they would have deleted them before passing the law). 
 209. But see BROWN & BROWN, supra note 192, at 86 (noting Judge Easterbrook’s 
position that “redundancy is common in statutes; . . . [not] every enacted word must 
carry independent force”). 
 210. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 211. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 71 (deeming this exception the “Golden Rule” 
of statutory interpretation). 
 212. 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 213. Id. at 458.  The Court noted “of any kind” was included in the statute to 
“guard against any narrow interpretation and emphasize a breadth of meaning.”  Id.   
 214. Id. at 457–58. 
 215. See id. at 458–59 (“While there is great force to this reasoning, we cannot 
think Congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that in the 
present case.”). 
 216. See id. at 471–72 (finding that Congress did not intend for the outcome 
advocated by the Government because America’s “laws,” “business,” “customs,” and 
“society” along with “unofficial declarations” and “organic utterances” suggest that 
“[the United States] is a Christian nation,” and it would be absurd to think that 
Congress intended to categorize contracts for foreign Christian ministers as 
misdemeanors).   
 217. Id. at 459. 
 218. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 71 (noting that, with Holy Trinity’s recognition 
of an “absurd result” exception, “the Golden Rule was born”).  The Holy Trinity Court 
itself listed several external sources helpful in analyzing legislative intent.  See Holy 
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2. Introduction to the structural approach 
In contrast to the strict constraints of textualism, structuralism 
considers the relationships among various constitutional provisions to 
discern the meaning of a given provision within the context of the 
whole document.219  This approach particularly applies to the 
constitutional principles of “federalism, separation of powers, and 
democracy.”220  As such, structuralism has been used to analyze 
controversies ranging from the scope of Congress’s power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to the limits of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority.221 
The Supreme Court’s 2005 opinion in Granholm v. Heald222 provides 
a recent example of structuralism.  In Granholm, the Court resolved a 
conflict between the Twenty-First Amendment and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.223  Michigan law criminalized the shipment of 
wine from out-of-state wineries directly to Michigan residents but 
allowed in-state wineries to ship directly to Michigan homes.224 
Michigan argued that this law was a permissible exercise of its Twenty-
First Amendment power to regulate liquor inside the state.225  
Opponents of the law argued that it violated the Dormant Commerce 
Clause because the Michigan statute discriminated against out-of-state 
wine sellers.226   
The Court relied on structural arguments in siding with these 
opponents and striking down the Michigan law.227  The Court held 
                                                          
Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 465 (suggesting an act’s title, the “evil which was intended 
to be remedied,” Congress’s impetus for acting, and congressional committee 
reports as persuasive sources of legislative history). 
 219. See BOBBITT, supra note 193, at 14–15 (defining the structural modality of 
constitutional interpretation). 
 220. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  
THE BASIC QUESTIONS 117 (2007). 
 221. See id. at 121–30 (providing examples of the Supreme Court’s use of 
structuralism to analyze constitutional questions). 
 222. 544 U.S. 460 (2005). 
 223. Id. at 471.  The Twenty-First Amendment overturned the Eighteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition of alcohol, and, in doing so, gave states the power to 
regulate “the transportation or importation” of liquor.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.  
Although not expressly written into the Constitution, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause stands for the proposition that the explicit Commerce Clause, located in 
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution, prevents states from passing laws that 
burden or discriminate against interstate commerce.  See generally James L. 
Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Dormant Commerce Clause, U.S. 
Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3—Supreme Court Cases, 41 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1, 13–15 (2009) 
(defining and explaining the Dormant Commerce Clause’s application). 
 224. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 469. 
 225. Id. at 469, 473–74. 
 226. Id. at 469. 
 227. See id. at 484–86 (discussing the relationship between the Twenty-First 
Amendment and the Commerce Clause). 
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that no language in the Twenty-First Amendment was meant to 
empower states to violate the long-standing Dormant Commerce 
Clause.228  It emphasized that the Dormant Commerce Clause was an 
important part of the Constitution’s federalist structure, and that it 
prevented states from passing laws discriminating against one another 
in the realm of interstate commerce.229  The Court concluded that the 
passage of the Twenty-First Amendment was not intended to upset 
that balance.230 
Analogous to structuralism is the statutory construction canon of in 
pari materia, which requires that new statutes be interpreted 
consistently with older legislation regarding the same subject 
matter.231  Like structuralism, in pari materia emphasizes context in 
interpreting legislative language.232  Accordingly, in pari materia 
promotes consistency and coherency among various provisions within 
legislation.233 
In pari materia has two separate, but related, components:  the 
whole act aspect and the whole code aspect.234  The whole act aspect 
requires individual sections of legislation to be interpreted within the 
context of the whole statute.235  In Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp.,236 the North 
Carolina Supreme Court used this aspect to interpret the meaning of 
the word “defendant” in a punitive damages statute, which capped 
such damages at $250,000.237  There, the defendant corporation 
argued that this figure was the maximum total punitive liability it 
could face in any one lawsuit, regardless of the number of plaintiffs 
jointly suing in the same case.238  Citing the maxim of in pari materia, 
the court rejected this position, finding that other clauses within the 
same statutory section referred to “a verdict” and “the award” as the 
                                                          
 228. Id. at 486.  The Court noted that “the Twenty-First Amendment does not 
supersede other provisions of the Constitution and, in particular, does not displace 
the rule that States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own 
producers.”  Id.   
 229. Id. at 472–73.   
 230. See id. at 493 (overturning the Michigan winery law because even though the 
Twenty-First Amendment gave states broad regulatory power, the Court’s Commerce 
Clause rulings require regulation to be done in an even-handed way, which was not 
the case with Michigan’s law). 
 231. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 99–100 (noting that in pari materia literally 
means “part of the same material”). 
 232. The whole statute maxim articulates a similar idea.  See BROWN & BROWN, 
supra note 192, at 89–90 (defining the whole statute maxim to mean that legislation 
should be read as a whole, rather than as individual provisions). 
 233. JELLUM, supra note 114, at 100. 
 234. Id.   
 235. Id. 
 236. 594 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2004). 
 237. Id. at 7. 
 238. Id. at 19. 
ISTA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2012 8:09 PM 
358 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:327 
operative words regarding maximum damages.239  Therefore, the 
court held that the statute was meant to cap each plaintiff’s individual 
punitive damages award, not to limit a defendant’s total liability.240  
Accordingly, it rejected the defendant’s attempt to read one part of 
the statute in isolation from the rest of it because such an 
interpretation would contravene the principles of in pari materia.241 
Similar to the whole statute aspect, the whole code aspect of in pari 
materia asserts that new statutes must be read in harmony with 
existing legislation about the same subject.242  This aspect relies on 
the presumption that legislatures are aware of all previous statutes 
regarding a certain subject matter when they enact a new law 
pertaining to that same subject.243  The Supreme Court has validated 
the whole code aspect, finding that in pari materia applies when two 
statutes “[b]oth deal with precisely the same subject matter.”244 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
followed this Supreme Court dictate in the 2000 case Florida Sugar 
Marketing & Terminal Ass’n v. United States.245  The court interpreted 
the meaning of the term “export” to mean only commerce done with 
foreign entities.246  In reaching that conclusion, the court read the 
Constitution’s Export Clause in context with other constitutional 
provisions relating to commercial activities.247  Through its analysis, 
the court rejected the petitioner’s argument because accepting it 
would have created inconsistencies among other constitutional 
clauses pertaining to commerce, namely the Commerce Clause 
itself.248  Thus, the court opted to interpret the term “export” in pari 
materia with all other constitutional provisions relating to 
commerce.249 
                                                          
 239. Id. at 20.   
 240. Id. at 21. 
 241. See id. at 19 (holding that the court “[did] not agree with K-Mart’s argument” 
regarding how the statute capped damages). 
 242. JELLUM, supra note 114, at 100.   
 243. Id. at 101. 
 244. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940). 
 245. 220 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  The court noted that constitutional 
provisions “should be interpreted to avoid contradictions in the text.”  Id. at 1337.   
 246. See id. at 1338–39 (finding that the Export Clause only applies to “foreign 
commerce, not interstate shipments”). 
 247. See id. at 1337 (“Reading the Export Clause in light of other clauses of the 
Constitution provides additional indications that the Framers intended it only to 
limit federal powers with regard to foreign commerce.”). 
 248. Id. 
 249. See id. at 1337–38 (recognizing the need to interpret the term “export” 
consistently with the Exports Clause and the Commerce Clause). 
ISTA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2012 8:09 PM 
2011] NO VACANCY 359 
3. Introduction to the historical approach 
Like structuralism, the historical approach to constitutional 
interpretation, which is closely aligned with originalism,250 looks 
beyond the plain text of the Constitution by analyzing the original 
intent of the drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution and its 
amendments.251  The theory holds that when provisions of the 
Constitution are ambiguous, courts should look to how the drafters 
and ratifiers of those provisions generally understood them at the 
time they were added to the Constitution.252  Under this approach, 
looking beyond the drafters’ and ratifiers’ original intent risks the 
courts creating, changing, or repealing constitutional provisions—a 
job that supporters of the historical approach believe is reserved for 
Congress and state legislatures through the ratification process.253 
The Supreme Court applied the historical approach in its 1983 
Marsh v. Chambers254 decision.  In that case, the Court held that the 
Nebraska Legislature did not violate the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause when it began each legislative session with a 
chaplain-led prayer.255  Though the literal text of the First 
Amendment suggested that this practice violated the Establishment 
Clause,256 the Court found that that was not the original intent of the 
Amendment’s framers.257  Instead, the Court traced the history of 
legislative chaplains back to the First Continental Congress and the 
                                                          
 250. See BOBBITT, supra note 193, at 12 (defining the historical approach).  See also 
SCALIA, supra note 193, at 38 (articulating his understanding of the theory of original 
intent). 
 251. See BOBBIT, supra note 193, at 12 (identifying the relevant inquiry under the 
historical approach).  
 252. Id. at 12–13. 
 253. E.g., Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner, Roberts Pledges He’ll Hear Cases With 
“Open Mind”, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at A1 (discussing Chief Justice John 
Roberts’s judicial philosophy, which he articulated during his Senate confirmation 
hearing).  Chief Justice Roberts analogized the courts to the game of baseball, 
opining “that it’s [his] job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”  Id.  But 
see Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, Judges Do Make Law—It’s Their Job, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 23, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-08-
23-forum-judges_x.htm# (rejecting the originalists mantra against “legislating from 
the bench”).  Chemerinsky and Fisk instead argue that all judges must make law 
because that process is at the heart of the common law system, which governs areas 
like tort law, contract law, and property law.  Id.  The authors also suggest that the 
very doctrine of judicial review, which gives judges the authority to declare laws 
unconstitutional, was made up by judges.  Id. 
 254. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 255. Id. at 786. 
 256. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added) (stating that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion”).  
 257. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788 (observing that the First Amendment’s drafters did 
not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a First Amendment 
violation because such practices had occurred since Congress’s first session).   
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First Congress, which ratified the First Amendment.258  Therefore, the 
Court concluded that the framers of the Establishment Clause did 
not intend for it to preclude chaplain-led prayers before the start of 
legislative sessions,259 meaning Nebraska’s customary practice was 
constitutionally permissible.260 
In the field of statutory interpretation, the historical approach is 
most often called intentionalism.261  To intentionalists, the 
legislature’s motivation and specific intent in passing a law are of 
paramount importance.262  In discerning that intent, a court looks to 
the legislative history of a statute, even if the text of that statute is 
unambiguous.263  Intentionalists have outlined a hierarchy of the 
extrinsic sources of legislative history, ranging from the most 
persuasive to the least persuasive:  conference committee reports; 
regular committee reports; earlier versions of a bill, including 
rejected amendments; statements made by the bill’s supporters 
during its floor debate, with special consideration sometimes given to 
the bill’s drafters and sponsors; and, finally, statements made by the 
bill’s opponents during floor debate.264 
When analyzing legislative intent, courts strongly disfavor statutory 
interpretations that would result in repeal by implication.265  This 
canon of construction presumes that when legislatures want to repeal 
a pre-existing law, they only do so expressly.266  Accordingly, judges 
                                                          
 258. See id. at 786–91 (chronicling the history of legislative chaplains in colonial 
America). 
 259. See id. at 790 (noting that it would have been odd for the Framers of the First 
Amendment, who had just opened their own legislative session with a chaplain-led 
prayer, to simultaneously declare such a practice unacceptable under the First 
Amendment). 
 260. Id. at 794–95.   
 261. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 22–23 (explaining the role of original intent in 
statutory interpretation). 
 262. Id. at 23. 
 263. See id. (contrasting textualism, which only begrudgingly looks to extrinsic 
sources when statutory language is ambiguous, with intentionalism, which embraces 
extrinsic sources of interpretation even when a statute’s plain meaning seems clear). 
 264. See id. at 161–65 (identifying and explaining this hierarchy).  Some 
intentionalists also consider post-enactment history, such as presidential signing 
statements and veto messages.  Id. at 164.  However, neither of those sources are 
technically legislative history since they come from the executive branch of 
government.  Id. at 164 (emphasis added). 
 265. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 192, at 94–95 (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross 
& Co., 426 U.S 148, 154 (1976)) (noting that the issue of implied repeal typically 
arises when one plausible interpretation of an ambiguity within a new statute would 
implicitly overturn a provision in a pre-existing law, but the legislature or Congress 
neglected to expressly address this apparent conflict). 
 266. JELLUM, supra note 114, at 146.  However, Jellum also notes that this is a 
“potentially flawed presumption.”  Id. 
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are very hesitant to interpret ambiguous statutory language so as to 
implicitly repeal another law.267   
In the 1974 case Morton v. Mancari,268 the Supreme Court utilized 
this canon to reconcile a conflict between the Indian Reorganization 
Act (IRA) of 1934 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
(EEO) of 1972.269  The IRA required that Native Americans receive 
special hiring preference for positions in the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs; the later-enacted EEO mandated that all federal personnel 
decisions be made without racial prejudice.270  However, the EEO did 
not contain an expressed repeal of the old IRA preference 
provision.271  Because the Court disfavors repeals by implication, it 
ruled that the EEO did not implicitly repeal the IRA.272  Instead, the 
Court reconciled the contradictory statutes by holding that the IRA 
preference was an implied exception to the EEO because both laws 
were aimed at tackling racial discrimination in the federal 
workplace.273  Consequently, the Court upheld the principle of 
disfavoring repeals by implication.274 
II. A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND ELECTIONS CLAUSE SHOWS THAT CONGRESS MAY 
REGULATE VACANCY-FILLING U.S. SENATE ELECTIONS 
The recent controversies surrounding U.S. Senate vacancies and 
the subsequent congressional attempts to legislate the issue prompt 
the question of whether Congress has ultimate authority to mandate 
how states fill these vacancies or whether the Seventeenth 
Amendment exclusively delegated this power to the states.  This 
section analyzes that question by examining prior case law on the 
subject and applying traditional methods of constitutional and 
statutory interpretation to the competing clauses at issue. 
                                                          
 267. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 192, at 94–95 (warning courts not to 
interpret an ambiguous statutory provision so as to effectively repeal another law). 
 268. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 269. See id. at 538 (observing that the IRA’s preferential language created the 
central conflict in the case following the EEO’s subsequent enactment). 
 270. See id. at 537–38, 542, 545 (explaining the requirements of each federal law). 
 271. See id. at 550 (noting the “congressional silence” in the EEO as to whether it 
repealed the IRA). 
 272. Id. at 550–51.  The Court categorized its decision as the “prototypical case 
where . . . repeal by implication [was] not appropriate.”  Id. at 550.   
 273. Id.  But see JELLUM, supra note 114, at 147 (suggesting that this reconciliation 
was disingenuous).  This canon does not mean, however, that courts never recognize 
an implied repeal.  See id. (insisting that specific evidence of Congress’s intent to 
implicitly repeal a law can overcome this canon’s general thrust).   
 274. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 146–47 (categorizing Morton as “[o]ne of the 
more famous cases addressing implied repeal”). 
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Although it never passed Congress, the 2009 ELECT Act serves as a 
useful proxy for analyzing the extent of congressional authority in 
this area.  Specifically, it is useful to consider whether the legislation’s 
mandate to schedule special elections within a narrow timeframe275 
after a Senate seat becomes vacant falls within the scope of both the 
Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment.  However, this 
Comment is not simply an analysis of the constitutionality of the 
proposed ELECT Act; rather, it analyzes more generally the 
principles enumerated in that Act, i.e., Congress’s constitutional 
authority to regulate vacancy-filling Senate elections. 
A. Enactment of Federal Regulations of Senate Vacancy-Filling Elections 
Would Be a Permissible Exercise of Congress’s Elections Clause Authority 
Federal authority to regulate elections for federal offices is limited 
to the power delegated to Congress in the Elections Clause, which 
authorizes Congress to regulate the “[t]imes, [p]laces, and 
[m]anner” of holding federal elections.276  Therefore, momentarily 
setting aside any changes that the Seventeenth Amendment may have 
made to this Clause, any federal legislation mandating how states fill 
Senate vacancies must fall within the Election Clause’s broad grant of 
authority.277  Accordingly, analysis of prospective federal legislation 
regarding Senate vacancies must start with whether the legislation 
represents a valid exercise of Congress’s Elections Clause powers.278 
1. There is no distinction in the Elections Clause between regular and 
 special U.S. Senate elections 
Just as Congress is authorized to pass laws concerning regularly-
scheduled Senate elections, it can also mandate the timing and 
procedure of special elections to fill Senate vacancies.279  Textually, 
the Elections Clause makes no distinction between general, regularly-
scheduled elections, and special elections required to fill sudden 
                                                          
 275. See H.R. 899, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (mandating that states hold a special 
Senate election within ninety days of a seat becoming vacant). 
 276. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also infra Part I.A–B (detailing the parameters 
of congressional power under the Elections Clause). 
 277. See, e.g., Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 554 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing the 
Elections Clause as the basis for both state and federal regulatory power over 
elections), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
 278. See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 258 (1921) (striking down a law 
governing party primaries and conventions because it was not within the “manner” 
provision of the Elections Clause), abrogated by Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 
290 U.S. 534 (1934). 
 279. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (arguing that “nothing in the text of the 
Seventeenth Amendment . . . distinguishes regular popular [Senate] elections from 
vacancy-filling popular elections”).  
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vacancies.280  Thus, textualists would likely have no problem applying 
the Elections Clause to both regular and special Senate elections.281 
A structural analysis confirms this lack of distinction.  As the Court 
found in Newberry, the word “election,” as used throughout the 
Constitution, simply means the “final choice of an officer by the duly 
qualified electors.”282  Both regular and special elections represent the 
voters’ final choice.283  Therefore, creating a distinction between 
regular and special Senate elections would subvert the Framers’ 
structural design.   
Additionally, Congress itself has previously adopted this 
understanding of the Elections Clause.284  It has already passed 
election regulations both for regularly-scheduled elections285 and for 
special vacancy-filling elections.286  Moreover, prior to the passage of 
the Seventeenth Amendment, Congress applied its Elections Clause 
powers to Senate vacancies through an 1866 act regulating the timing 
and manner of how state legislatures must appoint U.S. Senators both 
in the event of regular and unexpected vacancies.287  Accordingly, any 
new federal legislation mandating how and when states fill Senate 
vacancies fits squarely into this established congressional 
understanding of its Elections Clause authority. 
The principle of in pari materia bolsters this conclusion.  As the 
whole code aspect of that canon instructs, the same word is to be 
interpreted to have the same meaning throughout an entire code of 
laws, such as the Constitution.288  Hence, just as the term “export” was 
interpreted to have a consistent meaning among all constitutional 
                                                          
 280. Id. 
 281. See Gallacher, supra note 193, at 307 (“Any interpretation going beyond the 
text’s meaning is impermissible.”). 
 282. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 250.   
 283. Article I, section 2 uses the term “election” (and variations thereof) to 
describe both the general election procedures for electing Congressmen and the 
more particularized procedures for electing Representatives to fill sudden House 
vacancies.  Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1–2 (outlining the general election 
procedures and qualifications for House members), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 
(outlining the procedures for elections held to fill House vacancies).  After a duly-
held election, whether regularly-scheduled or otherwise, members of Congress serve 
their complete respective terms, subject only to expulsion by a two-thirds vote of 
either the House or Senate.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 284. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7–9 (2006) (creating various federal election regulations 
pertaining to both regular and vacancy-filling congressional elections). 
 285. See id. §§ 1, 7 (regulating the timing of Senate elections and establishing a 
national “Election Day” in November of even-numbered years). 
 286. See id. § 8 (regulating the timing of special elections to fill House vacancies 
occurring during “extraordinary circumstances,” such as terrorist attacks). 
 287. 14 Stat. 243–44 (1866). 
 288. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 100 (noting that “[i]n pari materia promotes 
coherence,” especially in reference to statutes). 
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provisions pertaining to commerce in Florida Sugar Marketing, the 
term “election” should have the same meaning regardless of where it 
appears in the Constitution.289  Therefore, to infer a distinction 
between special and general Senate elections would violate the 
principle of in pari materia, a result disfavored by the Supreme 
Court.290   
2. Congress is authorized to preempt state elections laws, including those 
 outlining the timing of special U.S. Senate elections 
From as early as its Siebold decision in 1879, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that Congress has “paramount authority” to promulgate 
federal elections regulations.291  Thus, that each state has already 
established its preferred method for filling Senate vacancies is of no 
consequence.  The Supreme Court has consistently held that federal 
laws trump state laws in this area under Congress’s Elections Clause 
power to “make or alter” election regulations.292  Therefore, 
legislation like the ELECT Act would be a valid expression of 
Congress’s power to “alter” existing state election regulations and 
would trump any pre-existing state laws with different processes for 
filling Senate vacancies.293  
Courts have made it clear that this congressional power to override 
state laws broadly extends to all laws relating to the procedural 
aspects of the electoral process.294  The setting of a special election 
                                                          
 289. See Florida Sugar Mktg. & Terminal Ass’n v. United States, 220 F.3d 1331, 
1337–39 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (using structural analysis to find that “export” should be 
interpreted in pari materia with other provisions of the Constitution relating to 
commerce, such as the Commerce and Exports Clauses); JELLUM, supra note 114, at 
101 (explaining, for example, that one statute criminalizing certain behavior should 
be read in pari materia with statutes criminalizing the same or similar type of 
behavior).  
 290. See United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940) (holding that statutes 
should be interpreted in pari materia when they “[b]oth deal with precisely the same 
subject matter”). 
 291. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 385 (1879). 
 292. See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (overturning a state law that 
contradicted a federal statute mandating a uniform day for federal elections); Smiley 
v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366–67 (1932) (asserting the supremacy of federal law over 
state law in the realm of elections regulation); Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now 
v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 836–37 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the word “alter” in the 
Elections Clause grants to Congress broad authority to override state election 
regulations where Congress sees fit to do so).  
 293. See, e.g., Foster, 522 U.S. at 69 (exemplifying the Court’s understanding of how 
the Election Clause allows Congress to alter pre-existing state laws; the Court termed 
the issue “well settled”).  
 294. See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366–67 (finding that Congress has the power to 
regulate a “complete code” over the “whole subject” of elections); Millsaps v. 
Thompson, 259 F.3d 535, 538–40 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that Congress can 
regulate “nearly every procedural aspect of a federal election”). 
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day is one of those procedural aspects.  For instance, in Foster the 
Supreme Court upheld a federal law requiring a uniform national 
election day for federal offices because that regulation fit squarely 
into the “times” provision of the Elections Clause.295   
The ELECT Act requires that special Senate elections be held 
within ninety days of a seat vacancy.296  This ninety-day requirement 
can be readily analogized to existing federal elections laws, which 
were interpreted in Foster, requiring that Senators be elected on the 
first Tuesday following the first Monday in November in the year 
immediately preceding the expiration of a sitting Senator’s term in 
office.297  Both laws mandate when states must hold elections for 
federal office.  Therefore, a prospective federal law like the ELECT 
Act, which only relates to the procedural aspects of voting, would be 
within the accepted reach of congressional authority under the 
Elections Clause.298 
B. The Seventeenth Amendment’s Vacancy-Filling Provision Did Not Alter 
Congress’s Broad Elections Clause Authority 
As the Supreme Court explained in Newberry, the Seventeenth 
Amendment “neither announced nor require[d] a new meaning of 
election” that would change any of the above analysis of Congress’s 
Elections Clause authority.299  Thus, it is generally assumed that 
Congress can still invoke its Elections Clause authority over Senate 
elections even in the wake of passage of the Seventeenth 
Amendment.300  However, the wording of the Amendment’s vacancy-
filling provision leaves ambiguity as to whether that result is also true 
for special Senate vacancy-filling elections.301 
Thus far, this Comment’s analysis has mostly (and deliberately) 
                                                          
 295. Foster, 522 U.S. at 69. 
 296. H.R. 899, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (2009). 
 297. Compare H.R. 899, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (setting Senate vacancy-filling 
elections exactly ninety days after a seat becomes open), with 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 (2006) 
(setting the precise date for general Senate elections), and Foster, 522 U.S. at 69–70 
(upholding one standardized election day as a valid exercise of Congress’s Election 
Clause authority). 
 298. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (discussing that Congress already 
regulates regular Senate elections via the Elections Clause and concluding that the 
Seventeenth Amendment did not alter its power to extend this authority to vacancy-
filling elections). 
 299. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 250 (1921), abrogated by Burroughs & 
Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). 
 300. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (touting the general agreement among 
scholars that the Elections Clause applies to regularly-scheduled Senate elections). 
 301. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text (discussing the modifying 
clause “as the legislature may direct” at the end of the proviso in the Seventeenth 
Amendment). 
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ignored the “as the legislature may direct” clause.  However, that 
clause represents the strongest argument that the Seventeenth 
Amendment usurped federal authority to regulate vacancy-filling 
Senate elections by giving states exclusive power to regulate these 
elections.302  This section explores the evidence supporting and 
refuting that notion. 
1. The textual approach suggests that states are the exclusive regulators of 
vacancy-filling U.S. Senate elections  
Textualism only considers the ordinary meaning of the text in any 
given constitutional provision.303  Thus, a textualist would ask what a 
reasonable person understands the words “as the legislature may 
direct” to mean.304  Examining only the words of the Seventeenth 
Amendment, it seems that such a reasonable person would conclude 
that only state legislatures have dominion over special vacancy-filling 
Senate elections.305  In fact, the vacancy-filling provision says nothing 
about Congress,306 but it specifically references state legislatures’ 
authority to direct special Senate elections.307 
For jurists like Justice Scalia, the analysis would end there.308  
Following his logic in Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Scalia would look only 
to the plain meaning of “as the legislature may direct.”309  Since that 
phrase is arguably unambiguous, Justice Scalia and fellow textualists 
would argue that no further inquiry is needed,310 and would bristle at 
any examination of extrinsic sources, such as the Amendment’s 
legislative history.311  Therefore, ardent textualists would claim that 
                                                          
 302. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 174 (noting that the author was originally skeptical 
of federal forays into Senate vacancy-filling laws because he feared that the “as the 
legislature may direct” clause precluded legislation like the ELECT Act). 
 303. See BOBBITT, supra note 193, at 12 (explaining that the textualist uses the 
perspective of the “average contemporary ‘man on the street’” to interpret text). 
 304. Id. 
 305. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (conceding that the phrase does “suggest 
that state legislatures enjoy discretion” over vacancy-filling elections).  
 306. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 2 (omitting any reference to the federal 
government). 
 307. See id. (thrice referencing the power of state actors, be it governors or 
legislatures). 
 308. See SCALIA, supra note 193, at 22 (declaring unequivocally that “the text is the 
law, and it is the text that must be observed”). 
 309. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(chastising the Court for looking to legislative history even though it concluded the 
phrase in question had a clear meaning).  Justice Scalia added that “judges interpret 
laws rather than reconstruct legislators’ intentions.”  Id. at 452–53. 
 310. Cf. id. at 453 (cautioning the Court against setting the precedent that lower 
courts should consider legislative intent even where statutory text is unambiguous). 
 311. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 17 (noting that textualists close the door on 
nearly all supplemental sources of legislative intent). 
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the Seventeenth Amendment made states the exclusive regulators of 
special Senate elections.312   
This plain meaning approach to constitutional interpretation also 
urges that the Seventeenth Amendment be interpreted to avoid 
surplusage or redundancy.313  Each word and phrase in the 
Amendment should have independent meaning or significance.314  
Therefore, to avoid the strictures of the canon against surplusage, “as 
the legislature may direct” must mean something.315   
Surely the clause does mean something if viewed as an exclusive 
grant of power to state legislatures to regulate special Senate 
elections.  In that instance, “as the legislature may direct” would 
mean that Congress’s traditional Elections Clause authority does not 
extend to special Senate elections.316  As a result, that interpretation 
renders the clause anything but superfluous or redundant.  
However, if that interpretation is not correct, the question becomes 
whether “as the legislature may direct” means anything at all.  One 
possible alternative explanation is that it is merely a reminder of state 
legislatures’ initial authority to promulgate elections regulations 
under the Elections Clause.317  A second possibility is that the clause 
does not pertain to the relationship between Congress and state 
legislatures, but rather to the relationship between state legislatures 
                                                          
 312. See, e.g., Rick Hasen, Illinois Scandal Spawns a Debate:  Amendment Would End 
Appointments, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009, 9:10 PM), 
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013171.html (suggesting that Professor 
Hasen’s initial reaction to the proposed ELECT Act was that it was unconstitutional 
because the ordinary and plain understanding of the “as the legislature may direct” 
language is that it does not authorize Congress to regulate vacancy-filling elections). 
 313. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 104 (explaining how statutes should generally 
be interpreted to avoid creating duplicity or meaninglessness). 
 314. Id. 
 315. See Vikram David Amar, Reforming the Way Senate Vacancies are Filled:  A Q & A 
About the Proposed Constitutional Amendment and the “ELECT Act” Bill, FINDLAW (Mar. 
27, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20090327.html (acknowledging this 
concern by offering alternative possibilities as to what “as the legislature may direct” 
means).  But see JELLUM, supra note 114, at 104 (contending that legislative drafting is 
often a sloppy process and that legislators rarely waste time arguing over possibly 
redundant language); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and 
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 812 (1983) (explaining that legislation is 
typically the result of political compromise, enhancing the likelihood of meaningless 
redundancies).  Posner’s observation seems particularly relevant to the Seventeenth 
Amendment, which took several different forms before Congress ultimately passed it.  
See supra Part I.C.2 (detailing the Amendment’s legislative history). 
 316. See Stern, supra note 174 (outlining the general parameters of the Elections 
Clause and noting how interpreting “as the legislature may direct” as an exclusive 
grant of state power would change that general understanding). 
 317. Amar, supra note 315.  Amar suggests that, under Article 1, section 4, state 
legislatures have the power to regulate all congressional elections “in the first 
instance.”  Id. (emphasis added).    
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and state governors.318  In that sense, the clause can be read as 
clarifying that legislatures, not governors, are tasked with setting 
special Senate election procedures.319  Given these two distinct 
possibilities, then, the canon against redundancy and surplusage does 
not doom an interpretation of “as the legislatures may direct” that 
leaves the Elections Clause intact.320  
Additionally, even if “as the legislature may direct” is unambiguous 
language, interpreting it to deprive Congress of the power to regulate 
special Senate elections could be considered an absurd result because 
depriving Congress of that power would be contrary to Congress’s 
intent in passing the Seventeenth Amendment.321  As its legislative 
history makes clear, Congress passed the Seventeenth Amendment to 
give state legislatures less, not more, power. 322  Yet construing the “as 
the legislature may direct” clause to give these legislatures an 
exclusive realm of power over special Senate elections produces the 
exact opposite result because state election laws are generally subject 
to congressional override under the Elections Clause.323   
The Holy Trinity doctrine illustrates this as well.324  Finding that “as 
the legislature may direct” is an exclusive grant of power to the states 
may be a plausible reading of the language—one “within the letter of 
the statute.”325  However, the Holy Trinity doctrine counsels that a 
plausible reading of the language is not dispositive in interpreting a 
given provision.326  Instead, a correct interpretation should be “within 
[the] spirit” of the law and “within the intention of its makers.”327  
                                                          
 318. Id.  
 319. Id. 
 320. See id. (answering the question of why the Seventeenth Amendment referred 
to state legislatures at all by positing two plausible reasons for the inclusion of the “as 
the legislature may direct” clause at the end of the vacancy-filling portion of the 
Amendment). 
 321. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 71 (noting that the rationale of the so-called 
“Golden Rule” of statutory interpretation allows judges to ignore plain meaning if 
such an interpretation would not be reflective of legislative intent). 
 322. See supra Part I.C.2 (chronicling the Seventeenth Amendment’s long path to 
ratification). 
 323. See Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 549 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that “the 
Congress that drafted the [Seventeenth] [A]mendment was consciously changing 
the system [of electing Senators] from one that was in the hands of the legislature to 
a new one”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).  The court refused to believe that the 
same Congress that passed the Seventeenth Amendment simultaneously re-
introduced the state legislature as the exclusive authority over special Senate 
elections.  Id.    
 324. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 325. See id. at 459 (cautioning that a statute can contain language that nonetheless 
conflicts with the purpose of, or intentions behind, the statute). 
 326. See id. (The Holy Trinity Court continued to interpret the disputed provision 
even though its plain meaning was “within the letter of the law”). 
 327. Id. 
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Here, the spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment and the intention of 
its drafters were to severely restrict state legislatures’ power over 
Senate elections, not to give the legislatures unlimited discretion in 
filling Senate vacancies.328  Accordingly, this application of the Holy 
Trinity “absurd result” exception would allow a court to look beyond 
the text of the Seventeenth Amendment.329  Instead, judges could 
consult extra-textual sources to interpret the meaning of the 
Amendment consistently with the goals of its framers.330 
2. The structural approach indicates that Congress has regulatory  authority 
over vacancy-filling U.S. Senate elections because that   result is necessary to 
maintain consistent interpretation between the Elections Clause and the 
Seventeenth Amendment 
Structuralism is one way to look beyond the mere text of the 
Seventeenth Amendment.  The approach focuses on the 
relationships inferred from the structure and context of the whole 
Constitution, particularly in the area of federalism.331  The 
relationship between state and federal power, a basic question of 
federalism, is at the heart of the controversy over whether states have 
exclusive authority to regulate special Senate elections.332  
Additionally, resolving this issue requires analyzing how a later-
enacted constitutional provision authorizing state action affects a 
previously-enacted provision authorizing federal action, which adds 
another layer to the basic federalism question.333  Since these types of 
questions are particularly amenable to structural analysis,334 it follows 
that structuralism is particularly relevant to the conflict between the 
                                                          
 328. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the motivations of lawmakers in fundamentally 
changing how Senators are elected). 
 329. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 71 (stating that once a court invokes the absurd 
result exception, judges can interpret ambiguous language to reflect the intent of 
the legislature even if that interpretation flies in the face of the plain meaning of the 
statute’s text). 
 330. Id. 
 331. See BOBBITT, supra note 193, at 14–15 (defining the structural modality of 
constitutional interpretation); see also BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 220, at 117 
(listing some of the most pertinent areas where structuralism is applied). 
 332. See generally Andreas Follesdal, Federalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Mar. 9, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/federalism/ (defining federalism 
as the “divi[sion] [of] powers between member units and common institutions).  In 
the United States, the federal government is the common institution, while states are 
the member units.  
 333. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (alluding to the conflict between the 
Seventeenth Amendment and the Elections Clause as one in which a subsequent 
constitutional amendment provided states with explicit power to do something they 
previously lacked any authority to do).  
 334. See BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 220, at 117 (identifying federalism as one of 
“[t]he Constitution’s leading structural principles”). 
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Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment.335   
In 2005, the Supreme Court undertook a similar type of structural 
analysis in Granholm v. Heald.336  The Court held that states’ powers 
under the later-enacted Twenty-First Amendment did not trump 
federal powers contained in the earlier-recognized Dormant 
Commerce Clause.337  In its decision, the Court emphasized the 
Dormant Commerce Clause’s importance to the Constitution’s 
federalism structure.338  Consequently, the Court found that even 
though the Twenty-First Amendment affirmatively authorized states 
to regulate alcohol within their borders, it should not be interpreted 
to overturn the limits that the Dormant Commerce Clause places on 
these regulations, including its prohibition of state laws that 
discriminate against out-of-state commercial interests or producers.339   
A similar analysis is appropriate to the tension between the 
Seventeenth Amendment and the Elections Clause.  The Twenty-First 
Amendment allows states to regulate alcohol, while the Seventeenth 
Amendment allows states to regulate special Senate election 
procedures.340  Additionally, the previously-enacted Elections Clause 
limits that state authority, just as the earlier-recognized Dormant 
Commerce Clause limited the scope of state authority under the 
Twenty-First Amendment.341  Moreover, both conflicts involve the 
proper allocation of power between the states and the federal 
government.342  Federal authority overrides state authority when the 
                                                          
 335. See Amar, supra note 315 (suggesting that analysis of the structure of the 
Constitution is one pertinent way in which to analyze a proposed law like the ELECT 
Act). 
 336. 544 U.S. 460, 484–86 (2005).   
 337. See id. at 466 (holding that Michigan’s winery law violated the Dormant 
Commerce Clause and that that type of violation was not authorized by potentially 
contradictory language in the Twenty-First Amendment). 
 338. Id. at 472–73. 
 339. Id. at 484–86.   
 340. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (abolishing federally-mandated Prohibition 
and returning to the states the right to regulate alcohol), with U.S. CONST. amend 
XVII (giving states the power to regulate the process of filling Senate vacancies by 
directing governors to issue writs of election and allowing state legislatures to 
empower the governor to make temporary appointments until the seats are filled by 
election).  
 341. Compare, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (granting states broad power to regulate 
elections but reserving to Congress the right to “make or alter such Regulations”), 
with Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 199 (1824) (generally prohibiting state regulation 
of interstate commerce, a power that is reserved to the federal government).  Justice 
O’Connor later explained the concepts behind the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
acknowledging them to be a creature of judicial origin that “not only empowers 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce, but also imposes limitations on the States 
in the absence of congressional action.”  C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 
511 U.S. 383, 401–02 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 342. Amar & Schaps, supra note 175. 
ISTA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2012 8:09 PM 
2011] NO VACANCY 371 
Constitution clearly delegates power to the federal government.343  
Since the Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power to issue 
federal elections regulations, its authority should supersede that of 
the states on this issue.  Therefore, just as the Granholm Court held 
that the Twenty-First Amendment did not overturn the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, a structural analysis shows that the Seventeenth 
Amendment’s “as the legislature may direct” clause likely did not 
overturn Congress’s “make or alter” powers under the Elections 
Clause.344  Accordingly, the Court’s holding in Granholm provides 
persuasive precedent in any potential challenge to federal legislation 
like the ELECT Act.   
Similar to the precedential holding in Granholm, the statutory 
construction maxim of in pari materia provides another structural 
analysis tool.  This canon requires that equivalent statutory terms and 
phrases be interpreted consistently.345  It is premised on the 
assumption that when legislatures pass a law, they are aware of all 
previously-enacted statutes dealing with the same subject.346   
That presumption is confirmed in this instance.  The Seventeenth 
Amendment’s legislative history shows that both houses of Congress 
were well aware that the Elections Clause gave Congress default 
authority to regulate Senate elections.347  In fact, some lawmakers 
repeatedly attempted to overturn that federal authority using the 
language of what would become the Seventeenth Amendment.348  
However, those lawmakers were ultimately unsuccessful, and the 
Amendment passed without any repeal of Congress’s Elections Clause 
authority over Senate elections.349  Accordingly, since Congress 
possessed direct knowledge of prior elections provisions in the 
Constitution when it ratified the Amendment, the “as the legislature 
may direct” clause should be interpreted consistently with those 
provisions, including the Elections Clause itself.350  
                                                          
 343. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466 (noting the supremacy of the Commerce Clause in 
reaching the conclusion that Michigan’s winery law was unconstitutional). 
 344. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (analogizing the holding in Granholm to a 
potential court case interpreting the conflict between the Seventeenth Amendment 
and the Elections Clause). 
 345. JELLUM, supra note 114, at 99–100. 
 346. Id. 
 347. See HOEBEKE, supra note 60, at 189 (noting the protracted fight over whether 
the states or Congress should regulate Senate elections). 
 348. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 213 (discussing Representative Bartlett’s failed 
amendment as the last gasp of Southern Democrats hoping to remove Congress from 
the role of Senate elections regulator). 
 349. Id. at 213–14. 
 350. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (identifying the particular relevance of 
this subjective understanding of the framers’ intent when analyzing the Seventeenth 
Amendment). 
ISTA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2012 8:09 PM 
372 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:327 
By faithfully applying in pari materia, the “as the legislature may 
direct” clause should be interpreted harmoniously with the rest of the 
Seventeenth Amendment (the whole act aspect)351 and other 
constitutional provisions covering the same general subject of federal 
elections (the whole code aspect).352  Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp. provides a 
useful framework for how courts might apply the whole act aspect of 
in pari materia.353  There, the North Carolina Supreme Court invoked 
in pari materia to decide whether a state statute capped punitive 
damages at $250,000 per plaintiff or per defendant.354  In its analysis, 
the court cited other language within the same statute as evidence of 
the structures set out in the statute, which this court concluded was a 
plaintiff-centered law.355  The court used these internal structural cues 
to conclude that the quarter-million dollar damages cap referred to 
each plaintiff’s maximum award rather than to the highest 
cumulative total that could be assessed against any individual 
defendant.356   
The Seventeenth Amendment has a similar internal structural cue.  
The first sentence of the Amendment makes clear that its goal is to 
empower people, not legislatures, to elect senators.357  Thus, this 
Amendment shifted the election of U.S. Senators from states’ 
legislatures to states’ voters.358  In that sense, the Seventeenth 
Amendment is a narrowing of state power.359  However, interpreting 
“as the legislature may direct” to mean that states are the sole arbiters 
of election regulations for special Senate elections would be a vast 
expansion of previously understood state power.360  This 
interpretation would ignore the Seventeenth Amendment’s structure 
by placing its two major provisions—how Senators are elected and 
how vacancies are filled—in conflict with one another.361  Instead, by 
                                                          
 351. JELLUM, supra note 114, at 100. 
 352. Id. at 101. 
 353. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 20 (N.C. 2004). 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at 20–21. 
 356. Id. at 19.   
 357. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (emphasis added) (stating that senators would 
be elected from each state “by the people thereof”). 
 358. Compare U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913) (directing that state 
legislatures select senators), with U.S. CONST., amend. XVII, § 1 (emphasizing that 
each state’s senators would be elected “by the people thereof”). 
 359. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 219–20 (bemoaning states’ loss of power after 
the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment). 
 360. See Amar, supra note 315 (noting that from as early as 1866, Congress 
recognized that it had ultimate authority over vacancy-filling Senate elections and 
that state regulations were subject to being overridden by contrary federal rules). 
 361. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (speculating that the default position in 
this debate is to apply the Elections Clause to all Senate elections, including those to 
fill vacancies). 
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interpreting “as the legislature may direct” in pari materia with the rest 
of the Seventeenth Amendment, it does not give states any exclusive 
power, meaning that the Elections Clause would still apply to all types 
of Senate elections.   
Outside of this internal consistency within the Seventeenth 
Amendment, the “as the legislature may direct” clause also ought to 
be interpreted in pari materia with other constitutional provisions 
pertaining to elections, as this is the thrust of the whole code aspect 
of the canon.362  As the Supreme Court has held, in pari materia 
applies when two provisions “[b]oth deal with precisely the same 
subject matter.”363  This command was closely followed in Florida Sugar 
Marketing, which interpreted the term “export” consistently with 
other constitutional provisions related to commercial activity.364 
The whole code aspect likewise can apply here because the 
Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment both deal with 
“precisely the same subject matter”—elections for federal offices.365  
As the Florida Sugar Marketing court ensured internal harmony 
amongst provisions relating to commerce within the Constitution, the 
Seventeenth Amendment similarly can be interpreted to maintain 
harmony among the Amendment and other constitutional provisions 
pertaining to federal elections, namely the Elections Clause.  That 
harmonious interpretation would apply the Elections Clause to all 
congressional elections and reject the notion that special Senate 
elections are solely within state legislatures’ jurisdiction.366  
3. The historical approach counsels that Congress can regulate vacancy-
 filling U.S. Senate elections because that result was the intention of the 
 Seventeenth Amendment’s framers 
Like structuralism, the historical approach to constitutional 
                                                          
 362. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 100 (distinguishing the whole code aspect from 
the whole act aspect by concluding that the whole code aspect seeks harmony among 
all laws concerning the same general subject matter). 
 363. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940). 
 364. See Florida Sugar Mktg. & Terminal Ass’n v. United States, 220 F.3d 1331, 
1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (viewing the term “export” in context with “the entirety of 
the relevant constitutional text,” including Article 1, section 8, clause 1 and the 
Exports Clause). 
 365. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (pertaining to the relationship between 
states and the federal government in regulating elections for Congress, including the 
Senate), with U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (outlining the process by which U.S. Senators 
are elected). 
 366. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (rejecting any exclusive authority in the 
“as the legislature may direct clause” by positing that a consistent interpretation of 
that clause with other constitutional provisions “provides no barrier to statutes like 
[the] ELECT Act”). 
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analysis,367 along with the intentionalist approach to statutory 
interpretation,368 also allows for looking beyond just the text of 
constitutional language.  These approaches use the motivations and 
understandings of a provision’s drafters and ratifiers to guide the 
interpretation of the provision.369  Thus, the intentions of the framers 
of the Seventeenth Amendment—why they drafted the provision and 
what they understood it to mean—are essential in conducting an 
originalist analysis.370   
In discerning this intent, the Amendment’s legislative history 
provides a window into its framers’ minds.371  As noted earlier, the 
Seventeenth Amendment by no means sailed through Congress.372  
Rather, it was the subject of intense debate, both within congressional 
committees and on the floor of the House and Senate.373  When 
trying to discern the meaning of the Amendment, this legislative 
history is instructive to understand what Congress actually intended 
the Seventeenth Amendment to do.374 
Traditionally, conference committee reports provide the most 
conclusive evidence of legislative history.375  Therefore, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s Majority and Minority Reports are among the 
most persuasive documents in the Seventeenth Amendment’s cache 
of legislative history.376  The Majority Report clearly articulated 
                                                          
 367. See supra Part I.D.3 (summarizing the historical and intentionalist 
approaches). 
 368. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 22–23 (explaining that discerning legislatures’ 
specific intent is the primary inquiry in any intentionalist analysis). 
 369. Id.; BOBBITT, supra note 193, at 13 (noting that the intent of a constitutional 
provision’s framers and ratifiers is the distinguishing feature of the historical 
modality of constitutional interpretation). 
 370. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (referencing the legislative history of the 
Seventeenth Amendment in reaching the conclusion that the ELECT Act would be 
constitutional). 
 371. See id. (suggesting that the Amendment’s legislative history, which evinces the 
intent of its framers, “strongly favors” applying the Elections Clause to vacancy-filling 
Senate elections). 
 372. See HOEBEKE, supra note 60, at 157–85 (tracing the Amendment’s path to 
ratification, which the author deemed “the deliberation to end all deliberations”); 
supra Part I.C.2 (detailing the Amendment’s long, tumultuous journey).  
 373. See supra Part I.C.2 (describing the positions of both the Amendment’s 
supporters and detractors as it was debated in Congress). 
 374. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 161–65 (outlining and ranking the various 
sources of legislative history). 
 375. Id. at 162. 
 376. See S. REP. NO. 62-35, at 1–2 (1911) (accompanying the Senate Judiciary 
Committee’s minority report opposing the proposed amendment providing for 
popular election of senators and recommending an amendment that maintained 
Congress’s Elections Clause authority over Senate elections); S. REP. NO. 61-961, at 1 
(1911) (accompanying the Senate Judiciary Committee’s majority recommendation 
for a proposed amendment that stripped Congress’s Elections Clause authority over 
Senate elections). 
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Congress’s reasons for supporting the Seventeenth Amendment:  to 
free deadlocked state legislatures to attend to other business in their 
states; to prevent corruption; to further the goals of open, democratic 
representation; and to align the Constitution with the public’s 
overwhelming support for direct Senate elections.377  This clear 
statement of legislative purpose and goals can be instructive to a 
court analyzing whether prospective federal legislation violates the 
Seventeenth Amendment.378  
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s Minority Report, which rejected 
any alteration to Congress’s Elections Clause authority, provides 
further specific insight into how Congress understood the 
Amendment’s relationship with the Elections Clause.379  This Minority 
Report argued against making wholesale changes to the federal 
elections structure contemplated by the Framers in the Elections 
Clause.380  Because this minority opinion reflected the position that 
eventually passed the Senate—that the Seventeenth Amendment 
would not alter the Elections Clause—it is a particularly relevant 
piece of legislative history that courts could—and should—turn to 
when interpreting the Amendment.381   
When courts examine legislative history, the proposal and failure 
of amendments is also instructive.382  As discussed above, the original 
proposal for the Seventeenth Amendment included making states the 
exclusive regulators of Senate elections,383 a proposal that would have 
altered Congress’s Elections Clause power.384  However, the Senate 
                                                          
 377. S. REP. NO. 61-961, pt. VIII–XI, at 13–15 (1911). 
 378. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 162 (noting that the Holy Trinity Court relied 
on a committee report to reach its decision). 
 379. S. REP. NO. 62-35, at 1–5 (1911) (noting that the proposed amendment did 
not necessarily secure the direct election of senators by the people, that the 
proposed changes would be “fundamental and vital change[s] . . . and should be 
regarded as far more important than the change from legislative to direct election of 
[s]enators,” and that the change would disturb the balance of power in both the 
Constitution itself and the branches of the government). 
 380. Id. 
 381. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 162–63 (explaining that, when considering 
legislative intent, “[i]t can be instructive to see what the committee . . . changed or 
rejected”). 
 382. Id.; see also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 515 (1979) 
(finding rejected amendments useful in interpreting statutory language). 
 383. S. REP. NO. 61-961 (1911) (providing that each state would be responsible for 
determining the “time, place, and manner” of holding popular elections for Senators 
and that, in the event of a vacancy, the state executive branch would have exclusive 
power of filling the vacancy). 
 384. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 208, 211 (noting that several representatives and 
senators proposed amendments to the original version of H.J. Res. 39 because the 
original version essentially eliminated Congress’s Elections Clause authority over 
Senate elections). 
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rejected that provision,385 and the House later defeated a last-ditch 
attempt to reinsert that language into the Amendment.386  Ultimately, 
two-thirds of both the House and Senate passed the Seventeenth 
Amendment without the rejected Elections Clause language.387  This 
shows both that Congress was aware of the issue of whether states or 
the federal government should have final authority over Senate 
election regulations and that Congress chose to maintain its “make or 
alter” power over Senate elections.388  Accordingly, any interpretation 
of the Seventeenth Amendment concluding that Congress abrogated 
its Elections Clause authority over any type of Senate elections is, 
arguably, incongruent with Congress’s explicit intent and, thus, in 
conflict with the historical approach.389 
Courts that have interpreted the Seventeenth Amendment have 
reached a similar conclusion.  In Newberry, the Supreme Court found 
that the Seventeenth Amendment left the Elections Clause “intact 
and applicable both to the election of Representatives and 
Senators.”390  Later, Valenti confirmed that, even after the ratification 
of the Seventeenth Amendment, states still derived their authority to 
regulate Senate elections from the Elections Clause rather than from 
a new grant of authority within the Amendment itself.391  Similarly, 
the Trinsey court relied on the Elections Clause to uphold a particular 
                                                          
 385. See id. at 211 (explaining that a substitute for H.J. Res. 39, which removed the 
language of the originally proposed amendment that gave states exclusive control of 
senatorial elections, was passed with a two-thirds majority). 
 386. Id. at 213; see also Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (emphasizing the Southern 
Senators’ failed attempts to re-insert anti-Elections Clause language into the final 
version of the Amendment to reach the conclusion that the Amendment’s legislative 
history counsels that the “as the legislature may direct” clause did not leave any 
exclusive power to states). 
 387. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 213–14 (recounting the end stages of 
congressional debate over the Seventeenth Amendment). 
 388. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983) (suggesting that evidence of 
opposition to a legislative provision “demonstrat[es] that the subject was considered 
carefully and the action not taken thoughtlessly”); Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 
(inferring that Congress’s rejection of these Elections Clause changes meant that the 
ratifiers of the Seventeenth Amendment knew it left that Clause untouched). 
 389. See Amar, supra note 315 (stating that the author has not seen a historical 
analysis of the Constitution that would call into question the validity of legislation 
like the ELECT Act). 
 390. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 252 (1921) (quoting 46 CONG. REC. 
848 (statement of Senator Borah)), abrogated by Burroughs & Cannon v. United 
States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). 
 391. Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 856 (W.D.N.Y. 1968) (per curiam) 
(noting that if the drafters of the amendment had desired a “radical departure” from 
the traditional understanding of the Elections Clause, then they could have written 
the amendment to reflect that legislative priority), aff’d, 393 U.S. 405 (1969).  The 
Valenti Court also held that, notwithstanding the Seventeenth Amendment, states still 
had “reasonable discretion” over the timing and manner of conducting Senate 
elections, particularly those held to fill sudden vacancies.  Id. at 866. 
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Senate election regulation in Pennsylvania.392  Most recently, in the 
Seventh Circuit’s initial Judge opinion, the court explicitly found that 
a “state legislature’s power to make laws governing vacancy elections 
is limited by Congress’s power under the Elections Clause to ‘make or 
alter’ such regulations.”393  This unambiguous interpretation of the 
relationship between the Elections Clause and the Seventeenth 
Amendment shows that states may regulate the “[t]imes, [p]laces, 
and [m]anner” of Senate elections only insofar as Congress does not 
make other regulations or alter any pre-existing state laws.394   
Given this clear message of the legislative history and interpretive 
case law of both the “as the legislature may direct” clause and the 
whole Amendment, it would seem incoherent not to apply the 
Elections Clause to all Senate elections, including those to fill vacant 
seats.395  Yet, as noted above, the plain text of the “as the legislature 
may direct” clause plausibly can be read as an exclusive grant of 
power to the states,396 which creates a conflict between the textual and 
historical analytical approaches.   
In Marsh, the Supreme Court suggested that, when presented with 
competing outcomes from a textual and historical analysis, the 
historical approach prevails.397  Thus, a similar result is likely when 
analyzing the conflict between the Elections Clause and the 
Seventeenth Amendment.  Taken alone, the words “as the legislature 
may direct” imply an exclusive grant of state power.398  However, the 
Amendment’s legislative history shows that its drafters’ motivation 
was to take power away from the states by having the people directly 
                                                          
 392. Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 1991) (acknowledging 
that the Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment work together to confer 
power upon the states to regulate Senate elections). 
 393. Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 554 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2958 
(2011).  But see Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 866 (emphasis added) (finding that the 
Seventeenth Amendment only “confer[red] a reasonable discretion upon the states 
concerning the timing and manner of conducting vacancy elections”). 
 394. Judge, 612 F.3d at 554.  However, at least one court has found that the 
legislative history of the “as the legislature may direct” clause is not entirely clear.  See 
Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 231 (finding the clause’s legislative history too vague to guide the 
court’s analysis in determining the legislative intent of the clause). 
 395. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (concluding that the ELECT Act would be 
constitutional because of the prevailing interpretation of the Seventeenth 
Amendment). 
 396. See supra Part II.B.1 (applying textualism to the Seventeenth Amendment). 
 397. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (upholding Nebraska’s 
tradition of beginning each legislative session with a chaplain-led prayer, even 
though this practice seemed to violate the plain language of the First Amendment; 
the emphasized intention of the original framers of the First Amendment, which was 
evinced by the fact that chaplains actually led prayers during the earliest sessions of 
Congress). 
 398. See supra Part II.B.1 (determining the plain meaning of the Seventeenth 
Amendment). 
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vote for their senators.399  In fact, the Amendment only passed after 
repeated failed attempts by some lawmakers to add explicit language 
altering the Elections Clause’s reach over Senate elections, which is 
evidence that the ratifiers of the Amendment understood the 
Elections Clause remained in full effect.400  Therefore, following the 
Court’s lead in Marsh, this clear legislative history and subsequent 
evidence of its understanding can trump the otherwise plain meaning 
of “as the legislature may direct,” meaning that the historical analysis 
could outweigh the textual analysis in the minds of a majority of the 
Court.401 
An additional reason for this outcome is the fear of judicial 
overreach, including the risk of improperly interpreting statutes as 
being implicit repeals of other pre-existing laws.402  Hence, repeal by 
implication is strongly disfavored,403 as courts presume that because 
legislators are aware of all pre-existing legislation, they only explicitly 
repeal existing laws.404   
As evinced by its decision in Morton, the Supreme Court prefers 
reconciling seemingly contradictory statutory provisions rather than 
finding that Congress implicitly repealed the earlier statute.405  A 
similar approach is applicable to the conflict between the 
Seventeenth Amendment and the Elections Clause.  Reading “as the 
legislature may direct” as an exclusive grant of state power would 
implicitly repeal the Elections Clause’s application to special Senate 
elections.406  However, Congress rejected such an explicit repeal of 
                                                          
 399. See generally ROSSUM, supra note 54 (detailing the impetus behind changing 
the way Senators are elected). 
 400. Amar & Schaps, supra note 175. 
 401. See, e.g., Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791–93 (1983) (upholding Nebraska’s chaplain-
led prayer because the First Congress and other early federal legislative meetings 
engaged in a similar custom, even though the plain meaning of the Establishment 
Clause suggests that this is an impermissible endorsement of religion). 
 402. See Purdum & Toner, supra note 253 (noting Chief Justice Robert’s warning 
that judges only need to be the umpires in a courtroom). 
 403. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 192, at 94–95 (stating that “[t]here is a 
presumption against repeal by implication” because, without express repeal, “the 
legislature probably did not intend to repeal the earlier act” and whenever possible 
new legislation should be read to coexist with the earlier statute). 
 404. See JELLUM, supra note 114, at 146 (explaining that legislatures make laws with 
the general intent of changing something; legislators are presumed “aware of the 
conflicting, existing law and specifically opt[] not to repeal it”). 
 405. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (reconciling two conflicting 
provisions, the Employment Opportunity Act and the Indian Reorganization Act, by 
holding that the IRA’s specific clause granting federal-hiring preference to Native 
Americans for certain jobs was merely an exception to the EEO’s general prohibition 
of using race as a factor in federal hiring at all). 
 406. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (noting the presumption that the 
Elections Clause extends to all elections for federal office).  Accordingly, not 
applying it to vacancy-filling elections would be an implied repeal of the Clause to 
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the Elections Clause during the debate over the Seventeenth 
Amendment.407  Therefore, applying the analysis of Morton, the “as the 
legislature may direct” clause instead should be reconciled with the 
Elections Clause.408  These clauses can be reconciled by viewing “as 
the legislature may direct” as either a reminder of states’ initial role 
in promulgating elections regulations, which remains subject to 
congressional oversight, or as a clarification that legislatures, not 
governors, are in charge of making state election laws.409  As in 
Morton, either of those interpretations gives effect to both the pre-
existing provision (the Elections Clause) and the later-enacted 
provision (the Seventeenth Amendment), thereby reconciling the 
two clauses rather than reading one as an implied repeal of the other.  
Consequently, applying the canon against implied repeal bolsters the 
conclusion that an intentionalist analysis favors applying the Elections 
Clause to all Senate elections. 
4. Federal legislation is a superior approach to amending the U.S. 
 Constitution in order to solve the current problems in how U.S. Senate 
 vacancies are filled 
Punctuated by recent events like the scandal in Illinois,410 it has 
become increasingly clear that Senate vacancies should be filled in a 
uniform way throughout the country.  This uniformity should be 
based on the principle that direct elections are best.411  Moreover, 
perpetual concerns about terrorism highlight the risks that several 
Senate seats could become vacant simultaneously should an 
unspeakable tragedy hit Congress and the country.412  Even in less-
tragic circumstances, such as when a Senate seat is vacated because 
the sitting senator chooses to take a position within a presidential 
                                                          
that narrow subset of elections.  Id. 
 407. See ROSSUM, supra note 54, at 213–14 (discussing the failure of Representative 
Bartlett’s amendment seeking to abolish federal oversight of Senate elections). 
 408. Cf. Morton, 417 U.S. at 550 (avoiding an implicit repeal by reconciling two 
potentially contradictory provisions in separate statutes). 
 409. See Stern, supra note 174 (suggesting myriad reasons why the “as the 
legislature may direct” clause was added to the Amendment). 
 410. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (detailing Governor Blagojevich’s 
political corruption when he attempted to sell his State’s open Senate seat to the 
highest bidder, an illegal action that ultimately led to his impeachment and 
conviction). 
 411. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (agreeing with the premise that direct 
election is the best way to elect senators, but expressing doubt that eliminating 
temporary gubernatorial appointments altogether should be part of the solution to 
address the current problems surrounding Senate vacancies). 
 412. See id. (elaborating on the crippling effect such an attack could have on 
governmental functionality).   
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administration,413 delays in filling Senate vacancies risk denying each 
state its constitutionally-mandated number of votes in Congress.414 
However, while both legislation like the ELECT Act or a 
constitutional amendment like S.J. Res. 7 would substantively address 
the problems with the current ad hoc approach to filling Senate 
vacancies, a standard legislative approach is superior for a number of 
reasons.415  Chief among these reasons is that legislation is a 
significantly easier political accomplishment than amending the 
Constitution.  Since the first ten amendments were ratified in 1791, 
lawmakers have only amended the Constitution seventeen 
subsequent times in the last 220 years.416  This is no surprise given the 
rigorous nature of the amendment process, which requires the 
support of two-thirds of both houses of Congress and three-fourths of 
the states for ratification.417 
Today, finding this high threshold of support for any prospective 
constitutional amendment seems almost unimaginable.418  This is 
likely to be especially true for an amendment that would federalize 
the regulation of special Senate elections because popular political 
factions, such as the Tea Party, generally oppose the Seventeenth 
Amendment’s consolidation of power in the federal government.419  
                                                          
 413. See supra notes 176–184 and accompanying text (highlighting that exact 
scenario when President Barack Obama selected his first Cabinet). 
 414. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (discussing the “antidemocratic 
consequences” of leaving Senate seats vacant for extended periods). 
 415. See id. (supporting the ELECT Act over S.J. Res. 7, which proposed amending 
the Constitution); see also supra Parts II.B.1–3 (concluding that a legislative solution is 
permissible because a textual, structural, and historical analysis of the relationship 
between the Seventeenth Amendment and the Elections Clause shows that Congress 
does have ultimate authority to regulate vacancy-filling Senate elections). 
 416. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (representing the last amendment added to 
the Constitution). 
 417. See U.S. CONST. art. V (outlining the amending process).  Alternatively, two-
thirds of states can call a Constitutional Convention to propose an amendment in 
lieu of the traditional process in which Congress first passes an amendment through 
a two-thirds vote of each chamber.  Id.; see also Mary Frances Berry, Amending the 
Constitution:  How Hard It Is to Change, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1987, at 93 
(recounting the difficulty in attempting the pass the Equal Rights Amendment, 
which never gained enough support for ratification into the Constitution). 
 418. Per Article V, a prospective constitutional amendment today would need the 
support of at least 290 congressmen, sixty-seven senators, and thirty-eight state 
legislatures in order to be ratified.  The sixty-seven senator threshold might be 
particularly onerous given the record number of filibusters during the 111th 
Congress.  See Brian Beutler, 111th Senate Breaks a Filibuster Record, TALKING POINTS 
MEMO (Dec. 23, 2010, 9:24 AM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/ 
12/111th-senate-breaks-one-filibuster-record.php (noting that Senate Democrats, 
who held the majority in that chamber during the 111th Congress, were forced to 
break more filibusters than at any other time before).  
 419. See supra Part I.C.5 (noting the relevancy of the Seventeenth Amendment to 
current political discourse, which includes the push by some in the Tea Party to 
repeal the Amendment altogether). 
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Conversely, regular legislation, like the ELECT Act, only requires a 
simple majority vote of support in the House and Senate to become 
law.420  Therefore, when juxtaposed with the prospects of amending 
the Constitution, regular federal legislation is the most politically-
feasible option for dealing with the Senate vacancy problem in the 
current political climate.421 
An additional advantage of regular legislation is the relative ease 
with which that legislation could be changed.422  For instance, if 
Congress passed legislation like the ELECT Act and a large number 
of states had valid complaints about a certain provision of the law, 
Congress could repeal or amend the law through the normal 
legislative process as outlined above.423  Theoretically, Congress could 
tweak this legislation until it reached the optimal set of regulations 
for vacancy-filling Senate elections.   
A constitutional amendment, however, would impose a permanent 
rule for how vacancies could be filled.424  If some portion of the 
amendment proved to be unworkable, the only way to fix that flaw 
would be to re-start the constitutional amendment process to 
effectuate a repeal of the new amendment.425  Therefore, the nation 
would be stuck with an imperfect constitutional amendment, which 
could only be removed through the arduous ratification process.  
Accordingly, basic federal legislation is preferable to the drastic step 
of amending the Constitution.426  
                                                          
 420. This would require 218 votes in the House and 51 votes in the Senate.  
However, modern Senate filibuster rules would effectively require a sixty-vote 
supermajority to pass this legislation in the Senate.  See Standing RULES OF THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE, § 22.2 (1986), http://rules.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm?p=RuleXXII (requiring sixty votes to invoke cloture on any motion before 
the Senate).  
 421. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (supporting federal legislation over a 
constitutional amendment by noting that statutes are more easily perfectible). 
 422. See id. (observing that statutory enactment can more easily respond to states’ 
experiences).   
 423. For example, the Senate recently amended a perceived flaw in the newly-
enacted Affordable Care Act, President Obama’s signature health care reform 
legislation.  See Vicki Needham, Senate Approves 1099 Repeal as Amendment to FAA 
Measure, THE HILL (Feb. 2, 2011, 7:08 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-
money/domestic-taxes/141855-senate-approves-1099-repeal-as-amendment-to-faa-
measure (discussing how the Senate repealed a health care reform provision that 
required small business owners to submit “onerous” 1099 tax forms). 
 424. See U.S. CONST. art. V (setting forth the exclusive means for amending the 
Constitution).  
 425. Id. 
 426. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (arguing that the Constitution should only 
be amended when the public distrusts Congress to maintain a certain new legal 
framework). 
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CONCLUSION 
Prompted by fears of corruption, state legislative overburdening, 
and the undemocratic nature of having legislatures select senators,427 
Congress and the states ratified the Seventeenth Amendment in 
1912, compelling the direct popular election of U.S Senators.428  
Those same fears have resurfaced in recent years regarding the 
process by which Senate vacancies are filled.429  Accordingly, some 
lawmakers have proposed solutions to standardize how states fill 
Senate vacancies.430  However, an apparent conflict between the 
Elections Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment has called into 
question whether Congress can take action in this area short of 
amending the Constitution. 
Based on a textual, structural, and historical analysis of that 
conflict, this Comment concludes that Congress does have the 
authority to regulate all types of Senate elections.  During the 
Seventeenth Amendment ratification debate, Congress passionately 
debated who should have ultimate authority over Senate election 
regulations.431  In the end, those favoring federal control won, leaving 
the Elections Clause applicable to Senate elections.432  Thus, the 
contemporary understanding of those who drafted and ratified the 
Amendment shows that they expected Congress to have regulatory 
power over Senate elections.433  Although a plain reading of the “as 
the legislature may direct” clause arguably finds that states retained 
exclusive control over vacancy-filling elections,434 this would be an 
                                                          
 427. See S. Rep. No. 61-961, at 1, 13–15 (1911) (articulating reasons for supporting 
the popular election of senators). 
 428. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (compelling the direct election of U.S. 
Senators); supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text (chronicling the final stages 
in the Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification journey). 
 429. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (noting how the recent Rod Blagojevich 
scandal in Illinois, among other recent questionable vacancy-filling appointments, 
prompted federal lawmakers to address concerns over how Senate vacancies are 
filled); supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (detailing Blagojevich’s fall from 
grace in Illinois). 
 430. See H.R. 899, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing that all Senate vacancies must 
be filled by a direct election within ninety days of the seat becoming open, but 
allowing governors to make temporary appointments to fill the seat until that 
election occurs); S.J. Res. 7, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing a constitutional 
amendment that would entirely ban even temporary appointments to the Senate). 
 431. See supra Part I.C.2 (outlining the arduous ratification journey of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, including the passionate fight between supporters of 
federal oversight of Senate elections and advocates of states being the final arbiters 
of Senate election regulations). 
 432. Id. 
 433. See Amar & Schaps, supra note 175 (arguing that the contemporary view of 
the Seventeenth Amendment’s framers should be persuasive evidence of its 
applicability to all Senate elections today).  
 434. See supra notes 301–10 and accompanying text (conducting a textual analysis 
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absurd result given Congress’s motivations for ratifying the 
Amendment in the first place.435  Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
dismissed such textual analysis when contrary structural and historical 
analyses compelled a different result.436  
Because of this analysis, this Comment also argues that a legislative 
approach to addressing the problems of Senate vacancies is better 
than a constitutional amendment.437  The most important reason is 
that amending the Constitution is a comparatively herculean task, 
requiring the support of two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of 
states.438  Given the current political gridlock in the United States, it is 
exceedingly hard to imagine that scenario happening.439  Moreover, 
constitutional amendments carry the risk of permanency, potentially 
burdening the country with an unworkable system if any aspects of a 
proposed constitutional amendment prove to be untenable.440  
Consequently, a statutory solution to the problems caused by current 
senate vacancy-filling laws is both constitutionally permissible and 
politically preferable. 
 
                                                          
of the “as the legislature may direct” clause, which found that the plain meaning of 
that clause does suggest exclusive state authority of vacancy-filling Senate elections).  
 435. See supra notes 322–28 and accompanying text (concluding that the Holy 
Trinity “absurd result” exception would require applying the Elections Clause to all 
Senate elections). 
 436. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476–89 (2005) (relying on structural 
and historical analysis to find that the Twenty-First Amendment, despite its clear 
language suggesting otherwise, did not overturn the application of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause to state liquor regulations); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 
786–91 (1983) (using historical analysis to find that the First Amendment, despite its 
clear wording regarding the freedom of religion, did not ban state-employed 
chaplains from beginning a legislative session with a public prayer).  
 437. See supra Part II.B.4 (positing reasons why regular legislation is preferable to 
the difficult task of amending the Constitution). 
 438. See supra note 315 (discussing the comparative difficulties of amending the 
Constitution as opposed to passing regular federal legislation). 
 439. See Tim Rice, Analysis:  U.S. May Be Entering Age of Political Deadlock, REUTERS 
(July 28, 2011, 10:45 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/28/us-usa-debt-
gridlock-idUSTRE76R43U20110728 (suggesting that, by mid-2011, the federal 
government had entered an “era of deadlock” and was embroiled in a “crisis of 
governance,” evinced in part by the prolonged debate during the summer and fall of 
2011 among House Republicans, Senate Democrats, and the Obama Administration 
over raising the federal debt ceiling). 
 440. See supra notes 422–26 and accompanying text (arguing that flexible federal 
legislation is preferable to a rigid, permanent constitutional amendment). 
